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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
he financial crisis has damaged consumer confidence in the financial 
services market. Trillions of losses in euros and government bailouts 
have partly been born by taxpayers, small investors and retail 
customers in several member states. In such circumstances, in order to 
continue the construction of the internal market for retail financial services, 
European policy-makers ought to rethink their approach to financial 
market integration and respond to the challenges that lie ahead in ensuring 
financial safety for retail consumers and enhancing consumer protection at 
the EU level. To do so, European frameworks for financial safety, 
regulation and consumer protection are necessary to restore market and 
consumer confidence in retail financial services.  
•  An integrated and competitive market in retail financial services is 
only viable if it is efficient, stable and inclusive, and if it provides an 
optimal level of protection for the public at the domestic and cross-
border levels. A new Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) post-crisis 
must reconsider the objectives and the means of its predecessor, the 
1999 FSAP, which was the blueprint for the construction of the 
internal market for financial services. The new FSAP must consider 
the appropriate lessons from the crisis and be aligned with the new 
philosophy of the 2020 European agenda for sustainable and 
inclusive growth.  
•  The single market in financial services requires a European solution 
with regard to deposit insurance to safeguard and restore the 
confidence of individual depositors. Such a scheme would in 
principle be a more efficient solution than the currently fragmented 
framework of almost 40 deposit guarantee schemes in the 27 member 
states. It would also help remove competitive distortions, deal with 
administrative burdens, avoid confusion for the customers of 
branch/subsidiaries and most importantly promote the internal 
market for retail banking. 
•  Implementing and enforcing existing directives in the retail financial 
market area, will not only help to achieve the regulatory coherence 
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and convergence necessary for retail market integration, but also help 
to ensure market confidence. Regulation must be enforced, as is the 
case for competition policy. Competition authorities have the power 
to levy substantial fines on market participants who breach 
competition law. Similarly, regulation needs to be complemented by 
a credible system of sanctions if rules are breached. The role of the 
new European Supervisory Authorities is paramount to achieving 
this.  
•  Consumers and investors must have access to the necessary and 
relevant information on all retail financial products supplied by 
financial services providers in the 27 member states to allow them to 
make informed, effective choices and decisions. If access to 
information is to be effective as a policy tool, it is important that the 
information disclosed to consumers is easily available, consistent, 
easily understandable and comparable, and that it covers the risks, 
costs,  features,  terms and conditions, and redress associated with the 
product and service. As soon as regulatory and consumer policy 
frameworks are maximally harmonised, an observatory of retail 
financial services should be established to improve transparency and 
ensure comparability among products and services.  
•  On the supply side, financial institutions, advisers/intermediaries 
and other players should be required to operate with a generally high 
duty of care in assessing consumers’ needs and level of financial 
sophistication, so that appropriate advice and recommendations are 
given. Mis-selling, unduly high prices, unfair commercial practices 
and the provision of improper information to customers must be 
banned and legally sanctioned. An annual consumer satisfaction 
barometer should be part of the strategies of financial providers and 
must become part of their annual reports.  
•  All in all, an EU ethical code of conduct should be agreed and 
enforced by the profession in close consultation with consumer 
organisations. Responsibility for enforcing the code should be taken 
by the boards. Consumer satisfaction is as important as that of other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the Commission should produce clear 
guidelines about i) consumer needs assessments (for example, 
information gathering, transparency level and adequacy of financial 
services) and ii) recognised professional standards to ensure that 
intermediaries/advisers apply consistently high standards in their 
domestic and cross-border services. The interests of end-users of INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | iii 
financial services (consumers, pensioners, small enterprises, retail 
investors and so forth) must be better represented at the EU level. It is 
therefore critical that the EU increases the resources available to 
advocates of end-users and develops ideas on how to create a more 
level playing field during the policy-making process in future.  
•  Capacity-building could be complemented by the creation of a 
European consumer protection agency in the medium term when 
evidence of more retail financial market integration is apparent. Its 
mandate would be to protect European end-users from deceptive 
practices by the financial industry and to enforce relevant regulations 
in retail financial services. The agency should be funded under the 
EU’s budget.  | 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ince the opening of capital accounts in 1988, the introduction of the 
‘single passport’ for investment firms in 1993 and the establishment of 
the euro in 1999, the integration of both wholesale and retail financial 
markets has been a European priority. Although the liberalisation of capital 
movements and the elimination of currency barriers have helped bring 
markets together, partly achieving a single market for the wholesale 
segment, market integration for retail financial services remains elusive. 
The most fundamental reason is that financial products reflect the legal, tax 
and regulatory systems under which they are executed and these systems 
differ widely across Europe. The integration process in financial services is 
founded on the interaction between minimum harmonisation, mutual 
recognition and home country control. Such principles have often 
produced mixed results because of the major obstacles they have 
encountered.1  
Adopted in 1999, the FSAP served as the blueprint for establishing a 
common regulatory framework for Europe’s financial markets. But it has 
been far more ambitious to achieve an integrated wholesale market than is 
the case for retail. The FSAP aimed at creating a single, integrated 
wholesale market for financial services and a secure and open retail market 
in Europe. This was regarded as critical for providing individuals with the 
best savings opportunities and for giving companies access to ‘deep and 
                                                      
1 Minimum harmonisation can lead to indefinite negotiation processes, which often 
result in watering down the main provisions and which leave room for national 
discretion. Mutual recognition has its virtues and deficiencies, but in practice it is 
hard to satisfy home and host country supervisors, particularly when the 
subsidiarity principle ought to be respected. Home country control can work when 
institutions enter into a foreign market through a branch but not through a 
subsidiary. 
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liquid markets for raising capital’. More specifically, a single wholesale 
market would allow corporate borrowers to raise capital on an EU-wide 
basis and give investors and intermediaries access to all markets from a 
single point of entry. At the same time, an open retail market would 
remove the barriers to the provision of cross-border retail services and give 
retail customers the information and assurance required to access services 
on an EU-wide basis. Much was achieved under the FSAP up to the 2005 
target date for implementation. The FSAP was followed by a White Paper 
on financial services policy, which outlined the Commission’s policy 
priorities for 2005–10. Besides emphasising the importance of finalising, 
consolidating and implementing past initiatives, as well as promoting 
better regulation and increased transparency, the White Paper launched a 
set of new initiatives in retail financial services, which are examined in this 
report. Until a few years ago, economic and market evidence suggested 
that European financial integration was underway in many sectors, 
particularly wholesale markets, stock exchanges, and clearing and 
settlement. Conversely the market for retail financial services for 
individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have 
remained highly fragmented and scattered across national frontiers. Since 
the eruption of the 2007–09 financial crisis, fundamental regulatory changes 
have been in the pipeline. The internal market for financial services, which 
was introduced a decade ago, was caught unprepared for the 
‘financequake’. The foundations of modern finance have been shaken and 
several years of internal market construction have been put to a serious 
test, highlighting the limits and risks entailed in the absence of a credible 
and functioning cross-border safety net, and the ineffectiveness of 
consumer protection rules.  
The purpose of this report is to assess the state of play and to 
summarise the main challenges in the wake of the crisis to building a 
genuine market for retail financial services within the EU. The ultimate 
goal is to both advance the Europe 2020 strategy and achieve an integrated, 
efficient, competitive, stable and inclusive financial market. The analysis 
focuses on those areas where integration is most limited: the retail financial 
services markets for individuals and SMEs. This report is structured as 
follows: Chapter 1 provides a general diagnosis of the situation and the 
remaining obstacles to integration in the retail financial market. Chapter 2 
analyses the key market and policy achievements in payments, retail credit 
and investment markets. Chapter 3 addresses the main challenges ahead. | 3 
 
1.  GENERAL DIAGNOSIS  
his chapter examines the state of integration of retail financial 
markets in Europe, the main obstacles hindering the development of 
an integrated market and the links between financial integration, 
competition, efficiency, stability and inclusion.  
1.1  What is an integrated market and how is it measured? 
The theory of market integration in its simplest form is characterised by the 
‘law of one price’. Broadly speaking, this means that when inter-market 
trading starts, observed differentials in the prices of commodities and 
services will tend to reduce and eventually disappear given the absence of 
any abnormal shocks to the system and the existence of individuals’ 
capability and willingness to engage in arbitrage.2 Additionally, the 
definition of integration adopted by the European Commission (2005a) in 
its Financial Integration Monitor 2005 has been taken as a reference point: 
“Financial integration is a process, driven by market forces, in which 
separate national financial markets gradually enter into competition with 
each other and eventually become one financial market, characterised by 
converging prices, product supply and converging efficiency/profitability 
among the financial services providers.” 
As pointed out in the European Commission’s definition, financial 
integration is a process, and dynamic by nature. It can be driven by EU 
policies that seek convergence and remove obstacles but also by broader 
market trends, including technological developments, communications and 
financial innovation.  
                                                      
2 The one price law is based on a strong assumption that transaction costs are 
neglected (Kleimeier and Sander, 2007). 
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Empirically, market integration is difficult to assess, as there is not yet 
a single accepted standard of measurement that encompasses a complete 
set of parameters driving integration in financial services. Academic 
literature has mainly focused on two types of measurement: the law of one 
price and quantity-based measures.  
Based on the law of one price, it is possible to derive measures of 
integration. For example, the cross-sectional dispersion of relevant 
variables (such as interest rate spreads or asset return differentials) can be 
used as an indicator of integration. Yet, it is maintained that the law of one 
price has a number of limits in practice because prices and specifically 
interest rates with respect to retail banking remain different among 
European member states, even for identical products. This is more likely 
owing to the extent of competition and the high degree of differentiation of 
products and services within the banking sector. Moreover, the reasoning 
behind prices neglects the underlying risks, such as differences in products, 
quality, efficiency and profitability. Accordingly, from the price-based 
assessment, only the risk-adjusted returns should be equal.3 But, as 
suggested by Adam et al. (2002) and then applied by the European 
Commission in its annual Financial Integration Monitor reports, the 
convergence of retail interest rates remains an accurate indicator of 
integration. For instance, if national interest rates react similarly to shocks 
in common factors, this could be perceived as co-movement over time, 
which suggests co-integration.  
The discrepancy in the average price for day-to-day banking services 
can also be used as an indicator of the EU’s retail market integration. It is 
calculated as the standard deviation of a region’s bank prices divided by 
the region’s average price.4  
Apart from price comparisons, other  quantity-based indicators are 
used to measure integration. These indicators directly assess the extent of 
cross-border flows (the number and value of mergers & acquisitions 
(M&As), volume of cross-border loans and deposits, etc.). Still, cross-border 
                                                      
3 See Flood and Rose (2004) for an illustration of this methodology to measure 
financial integration and the annual Financial Integration Monitor reports of the 
European Commission (2004a, 2005a, 2006a) for the application of this 
methodology to financial market integration.  
4 A minor discrepancy means that a region’s prices are close to the average and 
relatively homogeneous, while a larger discrepancy indicates that price levels vary 
greatly among banks in a region. INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 5 
M&As are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an integrated 
banking market. The absence of cross-border M&As can in fact signal the 
existence of an integrated market when integrated money or bond markets 
equalise the banks’ cost of funds and when competition ensures pricing 
based on these marginal costs. In such a market, there would be no 
motivation for cross-border M&As (Kleimeier and Sander, 2007).  
Furthermore, financial integration can be assessed by applying the 
concepts of convergence towards an EU-wide and/or best practice. 
E v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  b y  estimating the convergence of cost 
efficiency derived from applying stochastic frontier analysis methodology 
(see for instance, Casu and Girardone, 2002, 2007; and Weill, 2009) or profit 
efficiency derived from parametric and non-parametric models. The speed 
at which markets are integrating can additionally be assessed by using the 
concept of β-convergence.5  
Finally, macroeconomic indicators can be used to assess integration, 
such as the correlation between investment and savings within a country 
and the cross-border country correlations in consumption growth. To the 
extent that macroeconomic series are volatile, their use in relation to the 
integration of retail banking is undermined and need to be complemented 
by other indicators. 
No matter what the standard measurement is, the interpretation of 
market integration evidence should take into account other parameters, i.e. 
the convergence of regulations, removal of obstacles, harmonisation of 
pricing and so on, along with the types of financial service activities and 
the business models of the institutions (wholesale versus retail, proximity 
versus international, etc.).  
All in all, market integration is not an end in itself. The ultimate goal 
for an internal market for retail financial services is to establish a market 
that is efficient, competitive, stable and inclusive.  
1.2  State of market integration and main remaining obstacles 
In recent years, a number of factors have driven a modest progress in the 
integration of the retail financial market. These factors range from the 
introduction of the euro, the single monetary policy and new distribution 
                                                      
5 The β-coefficient is the estimated coefficient of a regression where the change in the 
spread between a specific country’s interest rate and the benchmark is regressed on 
the lagged spread.  6 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
channels (such as the Internet) for the provision of financial services, to EU 
passports and home country control. Notwithstanding these drivers, the 
retail business remains confined to national borders. The main reason is 
that retail consumers are naturally scattered spatially6 and have little 
mobility, which is in stark contrast to the wholesale sector.  
The empirical evidence7 on the degree of banking integration in 
Europe has not been very conclusive, although there seems to be agreement 
that more integration in financial services can be observed in the new 
member states (NMS).8  
In what follows, we summarise the key results from the empirical 
evidence derived from price and quantity indicators and we assess the 
remaining obstacles that need to be tackled in the future.  
Evidence derived from price indicators  
When using the co-integration9 of nominal interest rates to assess 
convergence levels, Kleimeier and Sander (2000 and 2003) found that the 
degree of integration was high in corporate lending, moderate in mortgage 
markets and low in consumer credit markets. Using the harmonised 
monetary financial institutions (MFI) interest rate statistics for the period 
from January 2003 to August 2006, Kleimeier and Sander (2007) concluded 
that mortgage markets10 exhibited little sign of integration (33% of short-
term and 17% of long-term mortgages were co-integrated). Meanwhile, 
short-term corporate loan markets (with co-integration levels of 75% for 
small and 100% for large corporate loans) and the market for short-term 
                                                      
6 According to the Eurobarometer Survey (European Commission, 2005e), the 
majority of EU citizens (85%) have effectively bought a financial product from 
another member state.  
7 When using the three criteria of the law of one price, cross-border banking 
business and the market share of foreign banks, Dermine (2006) confirms that there 
is no strong evidence of market integration in Europe.  
8 More recent evidence on the level of integration in the new EU member states has 
been more conclusive when observing the high presence of foreign-owned banks 
in these countries (UniCredit Group, 2008). 
9 Co-integration occurs when lending rates are tied together in a long-term 
equilibrium relationship that does not demand strict price or product equalisation 
(c.f. Kleimeier and Sander, 2000, 2003 and 2006; Brada et al., 2005).  
10 This is confirmed by the ECB’s report on financial integration in Europe of April 
2008 (ECB, 2008).  INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 7 
deposits, time deposits to SMEs and medium-term consumer loans 
continued to be highly integrated. But owing to the shift from the national 
retail interest rate (NRIR) to the MFI interest rate, it is not clear to what 
extent the observed increase in co-integration is truly a sign of more 
integration or simply reflects the more homogenous nature of the MFI rates 
over the NRIR rates.  
The cross-country dispersion of bank interest rates on loans to 
households for consumption (Figure 1) purposes has remained relatively 
high compared with loans to non-financial corporations.11 In deposit 
markets, time deposits show the strongest evidence of integration, while 
demand deposit and savings deposit markets do not appear to be 
integrated. It should be highlighted that the role of the single currency is 
central to the analysis, as it has introduced a shift in the structural 
relationships.  
Figure 1. Cross-border standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to 
householders (coefficient of variation) 
 
Source: ECB (2010). 
                                                      
11 These differences are mostly explained by the strength in negotiating power of 
large companies compared with consumers. 8 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
When applying the methodology to real interest-rate convergence,12 
country-specific effects have diminished over time, pointing to a reduction 
in the differences for some selected indicators. Moreover, as shown in 
Figure 2, the β-coefficient is often negative, indicating that the process of 
convergence has been continuing over time, although the speed of 
convergence (given by the size of the coefficient) tends to be far from -1 
(complete convergence), and it further decreased as a consequence of the 
crisis.13 
Some market participants argue that real interest rate differentials 
may persist or even increase asymmetries. As underlined by Kleimeier and 
Sander (2007), regardless of whether Europe attains full convergence of 
nominal retail loan rates, a country that achieves lower product prices by 
opening up its market will be punished by higher real interest rates. For 
this reason, an approach that simultaneously takes product and financial 
market integration into consideration would be more accurate for assessing 
price convergence (see also Delgado, 2006).  
Other recent evidence14 based on the pricing structure of retail 
banking products shows that there was a trend over the course of 2008 
towards lower discrepancies across European countries, providing an 
additional indication of increasing integration in EU retail markets. 
                                                      
12 The idea behind it is to examine whether interest rates across euro area countries 
have converged towards a specific benchmark over time. The benchmark chosen 
(σ-convergence)  is assumed to be the lowest interest level within a euro area 
country in each category that should reflect the level towards which the interest 
rates for the same product in other euro area countries should converge. 
13 Accordingly, factors such as different conditions in national economies (credit 
and interest rate risk, firm size, industrial structure and the degree of capital 
market development), institutional factors (taxation, regulation, supervision and 
consumer protection) and financial structures (degree of bank/capital market 
financing and competitiveness) are among the barriers to the complete 
convergence of retail banking. Similarly, Vajanne (2007) assessed the integration of 
retail banking in the euro area from 2003 to 2006. The estimation of the 
convergence measures, namely β- and σ-convergence, was used to assess the speed 
and degree of integration. The tests provided evidence of a process of convergence 
in retail banks’ credit interest rates for households and non-financial corporations 
and that this convergence is continuing over time. 
14 See the reports by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (2008) and 
Capgemini (2008).  INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 9 
Nevertheless, as shown in the next chapter, such an interpretation of the 
evidence may be over-optimistic.  
Figure 2. Beta convergence for selected retail banking interest rates  
 
Source: ECB (2010). 
 
Evidence derived from quantity indicators 
According to the statistics of the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
European banking market has undergone a period of consolidation in 
almost all countries. From 1998 to 2010, the number of credit institutions 
decreased at an annual average of between 2% and 3% in the eurozone and 
among the EU-15 countries. This comparable decline was significantly 
faster before and right after the enlargement with the NMS in 2004, but has 
levelled out over the past few years. Domestic and cross-border bank 
mergers (more likely in the EU-15) as well as the entry of foreign banks (in 
the NMS) can explain this trend. Nonetheless, this situation has been 
particularly dominated in the number and value of M&As among domestic 
credit institutions, which represent about 80% of total consolidation activity 10 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
in the EU over the period 1992–2001.15 Since 2003, cross-border M&A 
transactions have displayed slow growt h  i n  v a l u e ,  d r i v e n  b y  m a j o r ,  
scattered acquisitions in the EU-1516 and a wave of cross-border 
acquisitions in the NMS. Since 2008, the number and the value of cross-
border M&As have declined substantially as a result of the financial crisis 
(see Figure 3). Domestic M&As have been the rule and cross-border deals 
the exception. Transactions have been dominated by injections of 
government capital into financial institutions hit during the crisis, paving 
the way towards more too-big-to-fail players.  
Figure 3. Cross-border banks’ M&A activity  
 
 
In terms of branch and subsidiary openings, there has been a 
continued process of gradual market integration. According to CEIOPS 
(2007), the number of EU/European Economic Area branches increased by 
around 20% between 2003 and 2005. The median share of assets of branches 
remained constant at low levels, in contrast to those of subsidiaries, which 
                                                      
15 See Ayadi and Pujals (2004) and European Commission (2005e). 
16 For example, the Dutch ING Bank purchased German and Belgian banks, and 
the German HypoVerinsbank, after first having acquired Austrian and NMS 
banks, was subsequently bought by the Italian UniCredito.  INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 11 
have been increasing over the past decade.17 During the period 2001–06, the 
average share of foreign establishments of the ‘old’ EU member states 
increased from about 25% to nearly 30% in terms of total domestic banking 
assets, while the respective importance of foreign establishments in the 
NMS rose from 60% to 70%.18 The general refocus by EU banks on their 
domestic market is confirmed by the decline in the market share of other 
EU branches and subsidiaries in 2008 (18.8% compared with 20.5% in 2007). 
In summary, retail financial integration has been an ongoing process 
over the last decade when assessed through price and quantity-based 
indicators. Yet since the beginning of the financial crisis and the wave of 
domestic bailouts, this trend seems to have been broken, with several 
symptoms – including increased segmentation and a refocus on domestic 
business – having been observed. The future of financial integration 
especially in the retail market remains uncertain not only because of the 
existing obstacles that are inherent to the characteristics of demand and 
supply of financial services but also as a result of the new challenges 
brought about by the financial crisis.  
Main old and new obstacles to integration 
Obstacles to the integration of retail financial services markets are broken 
down into two categories. The first encompasses the so-called ‘natural’ 
barriers, which are mainly demand-driven. These relate to language, 
cultural preferences19 and considerations of geographical proximity. Such 
obstacles are generally difficult to overcome, unless financial players adapt 
their commercial strategies to consumer preferences and consumers are 
willing to change their preferences.  
The second category of barriers is structural and could be overcome 
either by market players or by legislative actions. These barriers are mainly 
related to the high fixed costs incurred in cross-border expansion owing to 
regulatory, reporting, tax and other impediments.  
                                                      
17 In 2008, subsidiaries remained the preferred form of establishment to access 
foreign markets, particularly in the EU-12, where EU subsidiaries accounted for 
around 59% of total assets.  
18 See European Commission (2008b). 
19 According to the ECB’s (2008) Blue Book, consumers in the UK, for example, seem 
to have more than two current accounts on average, whereas Italians have fewer 
than one per citizen.  12 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
Consumer-related obstacles 
Consumers generally opt for products distributed locally through local 
institutions, branches, subsidiaries and intermediaries.20 Indeed, customer 
mobility is discouraged by information asymmetries and high transaction 
costs stemming from several factors, such as the fragmentation of market 
infrastructures (clearing and settlement and payments systems) and legal, 
consumer protection and tax differences.  
Market integration is also likely to be hampered by a lack of 
consumer awareness of what exists elsewhere,21 the limited interest in 
shopping across the board and a lack of confidence. Lack of confidence has 
been identified especially in the retail market for mortgages, for which 
consumers may prefer not to change their mortgage contract, may shy 
away from high switching costs (repayment charges and some 
administrative costs) and thus remain reluctant to engage in contracts for 
cross-border financial services.22 The fact that consumers remain faithful to 
their existing local providers can also be explained by several shortcomings 
in European legislation, including the divergences in national civil, 
commercial, procedural and consumer protection laws. Finally, retail 
banking tends to remain relationship-based because of the potentially long 
process of building up a new relationship and in some cases the charges 
related to closing accounts (up to €60 in Italy) and switching banks.23  
The lack of confidence has been exacerbated by the lack of protection 
in the event of the failure of financial institutions. The financial crisis 
during 2007–09 showed how consumers can incur substantial losses due to 
the lack or divergence of protection schemes in their country.  
 
                                                      
20 For more information, see Eurobarometer 230, Public Opinion in Europe on 
Financial Services (European Commission, 2005b). 
21 A recent consumer survey by BME consulting (European Commission, 2007c) 
showed that on average 36% of the respondents did not know that they could 
invest their savings in another EU member state (with the lowest proportion 
(26.4%) found in Germany and the highest (56.5%) in the UK). 
22 According to the European Commission’s (2006a) survey, only 3% of 
respondents indicated that they had considered taking an insurance policy or a 
mortgage in another member state in the previous 12 months. 
23 Only 7.78% of EU consumers change banks in a given year; see Kleimeier and 
Sander (2007), pp. v, 3, 31, 54. INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 13 
Structural and regulatory obstacles 
These obstacles have direct consequences on the expansion of supply across 
countries. Among the structural and regulatory barriers are non-
overlapping fixed costs (implying the lack of sufficient cost synergies to 
offset cross-border M&A costs) and differences in tax treatment,24 
employment legislation and the legal structures of companies. Employees’ 
hostility and local consumers’ perceptions also constitute obstacles. Some 
other barriers relate to divergent supervisory rules and practices, such as 
multiple reporting requirements and complex processes for supervisory 
approval, which restrain the potential synergies arising from cross-border 
consolidation.25 Finally, legal impediments, nationality discrimination or 
protectionism inhibit market access and constrain optimal size.  
1.3  Integration, efficiency, competition, stability and inclusion 
The relationship between integration, efficiency, competition, stability and 
inclusion is not straightforward. Being integrated is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for being a competitive, efficient, stable and inclusive 
market (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Conceptual framework of financial integration  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Over the last few years, the EU policy-makers’ focus has mainly been 
on fostering an efficient and competitive, integrated financial market – 
which is acknowledged as being conducive to more competitiveness and 
growth. To achieve this objective, regulatory initiatives (the 1999 FSAP) and 
competition policy measures have complemented each other over time 
                                                      
24 Among them are value added tax (VAT) and other forms of double taxation. See 
Appendix 2. 
25 See appendix 1 on major obstacles to cross-border consolidation.  14 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
despite the limitations related to the enforcement of regulations and the 
limited scope of analysis of competition policy.  
EU policy-makers have nonetheless failed to promote a stable and 
inclusive integrated market. They have overlooked the need to examine the 
interactions between competition and stability on the one hand, and 
efficiency and inclusion on the other. Neither a common framework for 
financial market stability nor credible inclusive political approaches have 
been developed to help achieve these two very important pillars in the 
construction of the internal market for financial services.  
In what follows, we examine the interactions between and limitations 
of the analyses of financial integration, competition, efficiency, stability and 
inclusion. 
Integration and competition 
From an institutional perspective, and as discussed in the previous section, 
more integration can be achieved through the provision of cross-border 
financial services (through branches, subsidiaries, e-banking, etc.) and 
consolidation (through M&As, partnerships, alliances, etc.). The theoretical 
arguments for such a development relate to ‘size is beautiful’, market 
power and value creation for shareholders.  
Indeed, a more integrated market (through consolidation) does not 
necessarily mean a more competitive market. In this respect, there is a 
strong role for competition policy to ensure that in the process of 
consolidation, financial institutions do not abuse newly formed, dominant 
positions.  
The consolidation wave of the 1990s contributed substantially to 
changing the market structure of the European financial landscape, 
especially in the old member states.26 Concentration has remained 
asymmetrical, however, because national concentration has significantly 
increased since 2000 while this has not been the case at the cross-border 
level. In the last decade, the majority of cross-border transactions have 
involved financial institutions in the new member states.  
Nevertheless, significant differences continue to exist across countries 
(Figure 5). In some countries, the increase in concentration has reached 
such proportions that concerns have been voiced about whether it may lead 
to abuses of market positions. In others, notably in countries where small 
                                                      
26 See Ayadi and Pujals (2004). a
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and 2004). Between 2007 and 2010, further domestic consolidation 
occurred, particularly in the cooperative sector, while cross-border activity 
was almost insignificant.  
This trend was the result of two complementary stylised facts. On the 
one hand, domestic bank mergers are limited in some of the Western 
European markets (e.g. Belgium, Finland or the Netherlands) owing to a 
high level of market concentration and the high price of acquisitions. On 
the other hand, because of deregulation and financial liberalisation, 
emerging Eastern Europe31 provided the opportunity for exposure to 
higher growth markets than in many other domestic countries in Western 
Europe.32 Exploring these new European markets is explicitly supported by 
the European Commission, which has revised the European Banking 
Directive (2006/48/EC) to further promote and foster cross-border bank 
mergers (see Appendix 1). These tendencies reflect the extent to which 
concentration in domestic banking systems has reached levels that might 
impinge on domestic competition and could also cause concerns in terms of 
anti-competitive behaviour and financial stability in the domestic market 
(too big to fail, too big for the system and too big to be saved).  
It is widely acknowledged that increasing concentration can lead to 
market power, which may trigger firms to engage in anti-competitive 
behaviour. Bikker et al. (2006) suggested that the EU banking markets are 
generally characterised by monopolistic competition, i.e. in which several 
or many firms offer heterogeneous products and services, thus letting each 
firm have a certain degree of control over the price of its products and 
services. Internet banking has played an important and growing role in 
increasing the contestability of the market. According to the ECB’s (2007) 
report on EU banking structures, in Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy and the 
UK, online sales of retail banking and especially those by purely Internet 
banks are progressively more significant. The role of e-banking still faces 
difficulties, however, ranging from natural barriers (e.g. the preferences 
                                                                                                                                       
Netherlands-based ABN AMRO by a consortium of the UK-based Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Banco Santander and Belgium-based Fortis Bank in 2007.  
30 A similar trend was observed for the annual share of cross-border M&As in non-
EU countries.  
31 This includes the ten new European member states: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
32 For more details, see Measuring financial integration in new EU Member States by 
Baltzer et al. (2008). INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 17 
and confidence of consumers, differences in culture or language, and 
technology) to policy-induced obstacles (e.g. regulation and taxes). From 
the supplier’s perspective, the heterogeneity of payment systems and the 
problems associated with cross-border clients’ identification are also 
barriers to an integrated e-banking market. 
With respect to the resulting effects on consumers’ welfare, the 
evidence remains mixed, with some indications of welfare gains in 
moderately concentrated banking markets owing to lower lending rates, 
increased deposit rates and improved credit access.33  
Consumer behaviour is another structural element that plays an 
important role. The cross-border mobility of customers is a reflection of 
more integration and may reduce competitive distortions in the market for 
financial services. Indeed, a low degree of mobility domestically or across 
the board would signal the existence of obstacles to switching, which lead 
to more market power for incumbent banks and barriers to entry for other 
banks. Furthermore, close cooperation between banks and possible 
product-tying practices further hinder mobility. Currently, markets such as 
those for lending and deposits have largely kept their local character 
through their marketing and distribution. It has been roughly estimated 
that only 5% of consumers in the EU-15 hold an account in another member 
state and only 1% use other financial services and this out of necessity in at 
least three cases (second home, mobile executives and bi-national families), 
although 26% buy foreign products at home.34 Moreover, while the retail 
interest rates among EU member states have declined during the last 
period, they are still far from converging on an average level.  
An investigation by the European Commission, DG Competition 
(2007b) confirmed the low level of mobility of European customers.35 The 
enquiry’s results revealed, inter alia, that consumers hold their personal 
current account with the same bank for around ten years on average, 
compared with nearly eight years for SMEs in the EU-25 member states. 
                                                      
33 See for instance Walkner and Raes (2005). 
34 For an assessment of the extent of an identified need for simplified, standard 
financial services products, see European Commission (2004b) and also the report, 
The EU market for consumer long-term retail savings vehicles, comparative analysis of 
products, market structure, costs, distribution systems and consumer saving patterns 
(European Commission, 2007c). 
35 Two types of indicators illustrate customer mobility. They are referred to as 
“churn” and “longevity”. See European Commission (2006b). 18 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
Behind this overall picture, certain country-level variability persists as 
those in the EU-15 group of countries engage in longer relationships than 
those in the NMS,36 and the longest durations were reported in Nordic 
countries (Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden).37 Not surprisingly, these 
countries were also those that exhibited some of the lowest switching rates, 
as reported in Table 1. Among the main factors identified as reducing 
customer mobility in the sector enquiry, cross-selling and the tying of 
banking products constitute one important channel.38  
Table 1. Switching rates in the EU-25 
 
                                                      
36 The enquiry’s estimates of the length of existing current-account relationships 
report on average 10.40 years (consumers) and 8.56 years (SMEs) for the EU-15 
intra-average group against 6.28 years (consumers) and 4.67 years (SMEs) for the 
EU-10 NMS intra-average group. See European Commission (2007b). 
37 The enquiry’s estimates of the length of existing current-account relationships 
report 17.44 years (consumers) and 13.98 years (SMEs) in Finland, 14.33 years 
(consumers) and 10.45 years (SMEs) in the Netherlands, 11.82 years (consumers) 
and 12.33 years (SMEs) in Sweden, and 12.06 years (consumers) and 9.75 years 
(SMEs) in Denmark. See European Commission (2007b). 
38 See Renda et al. (2009).  INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 19 
Integration and efficiency  
Turning to the efficiency effects of integration in the EU, evidence is still 
highly controversial. Berger et al. (2001) elaborated on the potential for 
efficiency gains from European integration and related EU policies, such as 
the single market programme and European monetary union. They 
hypothesised that international consolidation of financial institutions 
should be intensified across national boundaries in the EU and should be 
related to several efficiency effects (i.e. scale, scope and X-efficiency effects). 
They underlined, however, that the existence of various barriers39 to cross-
border operating efficiency offset most of potential efficiency gains from 
cross-border consolidation. Casu and Girardone (2007) investigated the 
integration of EU banking markets by assessing the recent trends in cost 
efficiency using data envelopment analysis for the EU-15 countries. Their 
results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence in efficiency 
levels towards an EU average.40 The average, overall efficiency score for the 
EU banking industry over the entire sample period was 76.5%, indicating a 
23.5% average potential reduction in inputs utilisation. Nevertheless, the 
potential gains brought about by increased integration are offset by a 
decrease in the overall efficiency levels.  
Along the same lines, Ayadi (2006), in analysing M&As in European 
countries, concluded that there is no evidence of a substantial improvement 
in cost efficiency for the acquiring bank. In addition, applying the 
activity/geography matrix, she showed that it is much harder to enhance 
cost efficiency when the M&A involves different activity profiles. Similarly, 
her findings show no improvements in profit efficiency for the acquirers or 
for the targets and that the M&As diversifying geographically intra-EU-15 
that were announced up to 2000 failed to improve economic and financial 
performance.  
                                                      
39 Among them are the difficulty of managing and monitoring institutions from a 
distant headquarters; differences in language, culture and currency; differences in 
regulatory/supervisory structures; and differences in explicit or implicit rules 
against foreign competitors. 
40 Similarly, Weill (2009) investigated the convergence of banking efficiency for 
European countries between 1994 and 2005. He provided evidence of cross-country 
improvements in cost efficiency for all EU countries. Alpha and beta convergence 
tests support the view of a process of convergence in cost efficiency among EU 
countries. 20 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
Hollo and Nagy (2006) concentrated on studying bank efficiency in 
the enlarged EU. They confirmed the existence of the X-efficiency gap 
between the banking sectors in the old and new EU member states, but that 
the competitiveness of the old EU members in relation to cost efficiency 
was decreasing over time. Kasman and Yildirim (2006) ran a comparative 
analysis of bank efficiency in eight Central and Eastern European countries. 
Their results revealed great variability in efficiency and superior efficiency 
of foreign-owned banks. Therefore, one can expect only limited evidence of 
the beneficial effects of EU integration and related regulatory and 
institutional changes for the efficiency of the banking sector in new EU 
member states.  
Integration and stability  
With the increasing concentration levels in the national banking markets, 
institutions have become too big to fail and sometimes too big to save, as 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Too-big-to-fail banks in Europe and the US (top five banks, year-end 2007)  
Country Asset/GDP  (%)  Equity/assets  (%) 
France 293  3.5 
Germany 165  2.6 
Italy 131 7.4 
Iceland   890  6.3 
Ireland 404  3.6 
Luxembourg   854  5.2 
Netherlands   521  3.8 
Spain   184  7.2 
Switzerland   756  3.2 
UK 313  3.9 
US 44  7.6 
Source: Bankscope Database. 
 
The large size of these banks poses a serious concern for their 
domestic market and also for other markets where they are established 
through a branch or a subsidiary. A disastrous impact was shown when the 
top Icelandic banks (which accounted for more than 800% of Iceland’s INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 21 
GDP) were bailed out by the state, nearly resulting in sovereign 
bankruptcy. In a crisis situation and in the absence of a credible European 
framework for financial stability, uncertainties are likely to reinforce 
market disarray. The events during the 2007–09 crisis gave a vivid 
illustration of the weaknesses in the construction of the internal market for 
financial services.  
From a retail perspective, depositors in a panic made a run on a 
previously reputable UK bank, Northern Rock, notwithstanding the UK 
deposit insurance system; furious investors lost years of savings in one of 
the leading Belgian banks, Fortis, and in subsidiaries of Icelandic banks.  
Moreover, the degree to which banks might be at risk from market 
turbulence, as can be measured by the capitalisation ratio (capital as a 
percentage of total assets), which is supposed to assess their solidity, also 
varies considerably from one member state to another. German banks 
appear to be the least capitalised in Europe, holding core capital of 2.6% 
meaning €2.6 in capital for every €100 of assets. By contrast, Italian banks 
hold about three times as much capital (€7.4 per €100 of total assets). In an 
integrated market, such discrepancies are hardly sustainable.  
In addition, the protection of such institutions raises important 
competitive issues and can generate moral hazard incentives in the long 
run. This reveals a poorly explored relationship between stability, 
competition and integration, which until today, has been overlooked by 
policy-makers. In addition, rules that typically apply can be waived or 
ignored or leniently interpreted (e.g. state aid rules in the EU or fiscal rules 
for the eurozone member states) in a crisis context. 
Integration and inclusion  
While financial institutions are racing to increase capitalisation and profits 
through the strategies they opt for (for example, cross-border M&As), 
financial exclusion emerges as a critical issue and deserves careful 
independent assessment. The apparent dichotomy between a ‘free 
competition’ model and the ‘public good’ aspect of basic financial services 
is at the heart of the policy debate on tackling financial exclusion and 
ultimately social exclusion.  22 | GENERAL DIAGNOSIS 
Financial exclusion appears to be a growing problem in the EU.41 
Within a context of market liberalisation, increased competition, integration 
and technological development, “the general economic interest missions are 
means by which a balance may be struck between competition and 
protecting more vulnerable consumers”.42 Hence, the financial services 
industry has an important role in ensuring the access to and use of basic 
financial services by every citizen. Obviously, this role depends on the 
country in question43 and the interaction of several factors, including the 
market structure, the financial institutions’ business models, the dual 
bottom line nature of the institutions and the role of the government at the 
national and regional levels. Clearly, there is a need to consider the possible 
friction between the race for more integration, notably through national and 
cross-border champions, more economic efficiency and social cohesion, 
which could be enhanced by a diverse banking sector serving a multitude 
of market segments.44 Indeed, many financial institutions (particularly 
shareholder value institutions) face imperatives of value creation, 
shareholders’ satisfaction and expansion of activities beyond national 
borders. This pressure not only requires them to opt for programmes of cost 
reductions (including branch closures in remote areas) but may also result 
in poor incentives to supply unprofitable basic financial services and so 
forth. These impulses are contradictory to enhancing financial inclusion and 
social cohesion.  
In conclusion, to ensure a balanced interaction between integration, 
efficiency, competition, stability and inclusion, and in line with the 
European 2020 smart, sustainable and inclusive growth strategy, the 
European Commission must revisit the philosophy for the internal market 
for financial services, with a view towards a more balanced approach and 
one that is aligned with the new European growth strategy. A post-crisis 
Financial Services Action Plan must be drafted, while factoring in equally 
these four concepts that are crucial to the future of financial market 
integration.
                                                      
41 According to Eurostat (2006), around 16% of the EU population lives on less than 
60% of the median national income, the low-income threshold set to measure 
relative poverty. 
42 See Carbó et al. (2005). 
43 See Ayadi and Rokiewitcz (2008).  
44 See Ayadi et al. (2009 and 2010).  | 23 
 
2.  MARKETS AND POLICY ASSESSMENT  
n this chapter, we assess market and policy initiatives to foster 
integration in retail financial services. The chapter covers payments, 
credit and investment markets.  
2.1  Payments market 
The popularity of payment instruments varies across the EU. The most 
predominant forms of these transactions (in terms of total value) are credit 
transfers and direct debits (both of which are Single European Payments 
Area (SEPA) instruments). Although they are frequently conducted (see 
Figure 6, panel a), point-of-sale (POS) payments45 comprise less than 10% of 
GDP, except in a handful of countries (Figure 6, panel b). The use of 
cheques as a means of payment is still prevalent in a number of highly 
ranked countries, such as Cyprus, France, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the 
UK.  
Figure 6. Payment instruments in Europe in 2007 
Panel a 
 
                                                      
45 These are payment transactions initiated through a POS terminal using a card 
with debit, credit or delayed-debit functions. 
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Panel b 
 
Source: ECB Blue Book (2008). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7, there is a high degree of diversity in the 
tariffs for payment instruments among countries in the EU. The prevalence 
of such discrepancies makes cross-border price comparability difficult to 
achieve.  
Figure 7. Pricing of payment instruments (€) 
a) Pricing of credit transfers 
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b) Pricing of direct debit 
 
 
 
 
c) Pricing of debit cards  
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d) Pricing of delayed debit and credit cards 
 
Source: European Commission (2008a). 
 
As far as current accounts46 are concerned, there is wide diversity in 
pricing across the 27 member states. In a profile on average usage, Italy, 
Spain and France rank at the top while the new EU member states rank at 
the bottom.47 This discrepancy is a result of different competitive 
conditions, cost structures, pricing models, and the level of tying and 
bundling of products. The breakdown of annual charges48 shows that the 
                                                      
46 These accounts typically include all payment instrument plus opening and 
closing charges. 
47 This ranking does not take the purchasing power parity (PPP) into account; yet 
when applying PPP, the ranking does not change. 
48 The breakdown covers the following annual charges:  
•  basic annual charges, including package fees and account maintenance charges;  
•  account charges, including charges for opening and closing an account, 
statements, overdrafts and insufficient funds, over-the-counter withdrawals 
and deposits, account movements, Internet and phone banking, and income 
related to credit interest on accounts in credit;  
•  debit card charges, including issuance and annual fees, fees for blocking and 
replacement, and charges for withdrawals, POS and online payments;  
•  credit card charges, including issuance and annual fees, fees for blocking and 
replacement, and charges for withdrawals, POS and online payments;  
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persistence of this discrepancy across the 27 EU member states (see Figure 
8, panels a and b).  
Figure 8. Pricing of current accounts in Europe (in 2009)  
Panel a 
 
Panel b 
 
Source: European Commission (2009d). 
                                                                                                                                       
•  credit transfer charges, including fees for receiving and sending credit transfers, 
receiving and sending standing orders and charges for setup, modification and 
closure of standing orders;  
•  direct debit charges, including fees for sending direct debits, and the setup and 
closure of direct debit orders; and  
•  cheque-related charges, including fees for the order of chequebooks, along with 
drawing, lodging and bouncing cheques. 
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It is expected that SEPA49 will lead to more harmonisation in the 
tariffs for payment instruments50 across EU member states. Several 
potential (not yet proven), positive changes are sought for consumers, 
merchants and the industry (see Table 3). These changes will not be 
without costs for the end-users, however.  
Table 3. SEPA’s potential impacts on end-users 
Users  SEPA’s potential impacts 
Consumers  •  More universal and predictable payments and transfers from/to 
home banks to/from any other SEPA country using common 
standards 
•  More choice of products and services at more competitive prices 
•  Wider choice of purchases and cash withdrawals across SEPA 
countries 
•  Improvements in the safety and security of purchases and cash 
withdrawals 
•  Full transparency and disclosure of charges, fees and exchange 
rates 
•  Common legal framework for refunds, disputes and complaints 
                                                      
49 SEPA is defined in the European Payments Council (EPC) Roadmap in 
December 2004 as “the area where citizens, companies and other economic actors 
will be able to make payments in euro within Europe whether between or within 
national boundaries under the same basic conditions, rights and obligations, 
regardless of their locations” (see the EPC website, “What is SEPA?”, 
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/content.cfm?page=sepa_vision_and_ 
goals).  
The main aim of SEPA is to improve the efficiency of the cross-border euro 
retail payments and to restructure and modernise fragmented national payment 
instruments with the implementation of new, common business rules and technical 
standards. The legal underpinning of SEPA is the Payment Services Directive, 
which has been transposed into national laws since November 2009. The Payment 
Services Directive covers the right to provide payment services to the public by all 
payment services providers; the transparency and information requirements to 
protect consumers; and rights and obligations of users and providers of payment 
services. On 28 January 2008, SEPA was officially launched by the European 
Commission, the ECB and the European Payments Council. Since then, the first 
SEPA credit transfer and direct debit payments have been made possible through 
the plans of all market participants to progressive migrate to the new SEPA 
payment products (by end 2010).  
50 SEPA payment instruments – credit transfers, direct debits and card payments – 
are to migrate to interoperable formats and processes across all of the euro area 
and future SEPA participants. INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 29 
Table 3. cont’d 
Merchants  •  The ability to accept payments from all SEPA countries leading to 
more sale possibilities 
•  Reduced cash holding and improved security 
•  Reduction of fraud in card payments and a harmonised 
framework for fraud management and reporting 
•  Terminal and transaction cost reductions through economies of 
scale 
•  Simplified back office processes (also for banks) 
•  Wider choice for acquirer services 
Large 
merchants 
and 
corporates 
(additional) 
•  Construction of a standard platform for their euro payment 
operations because of common standards 
•  Fewer barriers to expansion stemming from payment processing 
constraints and the reduction of commercial and technical 
barriers 
•  Major savings from 1) exemption processing, 2) automated 
standing data setup, and 3) better and guaranteed remittance 
data 
SMEs  
(additional) 
•  Improved cash flows and the reduction of processing costs owing 
to faster settlements and simplified processing 
•  New, consistent legal framework for payments and redress to 
boost cross-border selling 
•  More euro payments possible with more certainty and clarity 
•  More efficient transfers for purchases and greater choice of 
payment products 
Government 
and public 
adminis-
trators 
•  Common schemes operating to common standards are expected 
to deliver better services to citizens 
•  Procurement of payment services will no longer be limited to 
local banks 
•  Simpler regulatory monitoring of providers of payment services  
Banks  •  Supply of accounts that are usable in all SEPA countries, 
regardless of size 
•  Development of innovative products at a lower cost through 
technology and homogeneous standards 
•  New market opportunities (access to business with large 
merchants and corporates, M&A possibilities from the reduction 
of country-specific platform costs, new value-added services) 
•  More options for the procurement process 
•  More transparency and clarity of charges 
•  Reduction of internal and external costs 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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In theory, retail consumers should be able to pay with their debit 
cards everywhere in Europe, to use the same bank accounts even when 
studying and working abroad and to use direct debits from anywhere in 
Europe. Yet these expectations depend on the costs, pricing and quality 
standards of the new SEPA instruments, the information consumers 
receive, the service quality in terms of helping consumers to use the IBAN 
and BIC codes, and solving issues pertaining to the security of direct debits 
and whether consumer mobility is facilitated and competition fostered. 
According to a study by AT Kearney,51 banks are expected to make 
significant investments in payment systems at both the front and back 
ends. Costs will be even greater, particularly in the absence of a phase-out 
date for national instruments, during the coexistence of old and new 
instruments for an undetermined length of time and the uncertainty 
surrounding the ‘voluntary’ process for migration. Such costs will be 
passed on to end-users of payment instruments.  
As shown above, end-users face vastly different pricing structures for 
similar instruments. For example, a debit card transaction in Denmark is 
free to the merchant, while in other countries merchants are charged a 
service fee of up to 1.5%. In most countries, debit cards are either free or 
carry a low annual fee (from €5 to €10), while in France the annual fee is 
between €30 and €40. SEPA is expected to foster competition while 
alleviating many of these differences as banks and payment providers seek 
to find a fair pricing structure for their products across Europe. SEPA 
instruments will not come without a cost and the low price of domestic 
instruments might not always be sustainable in light of the new 
instruments. Several services – including encryption, fraud detection and 
other sophisticated standards – are costly and therefore selective price 
increases might be required, especially for cards. Operating a pan-
European infrastructure cannot be without a certain transactional fee. As a 
consequence, there is an expectation that low-fee countries, such as 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, might face price increases, while 
other countries like France might see price decreases for payment and card 
users. The average effect will likely be a price reduction but not necessarily 
an aggressive race to the bottom. There is also an expectation towards 
convergence on a fair pricing structure, albeit with uncertainty with respect 
to the determination of the fair price and the sharing mechanism among 
                                                      
51 See the AT Kearney (2008) study on The SEPA shake-out: Challenges in cards and 
payments. INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 31 
providers. A provider that dominates a certain market will be less price-
sensitive and therefore will be advantaged.  
With the integration of the markets, smaller players will find it 
difficult to bear the new investments, which come at a fixed cost and may 
not be offset by a large number of transactions. Only a limited number of 
international and pan-European players will be able to leverage their 
European networks and volumes to amortise these investments, 
particularly when it comes to value added services (such as guaranteed 
payments and advanced reporting facilities). The good news is that SEPA 
will allow payment providers in general to expand more easily across 
Europe as instruments become similar and traditional country barriers are 
removed. This is already happening in a number of places for both 
payments and cards (e.g. the merger between Interpay Nederland and the 
German company Transaktionsinstitut to form Equens, a pan-European 
provider that is becoming active in Belgium, Finland, Italy and other 
countries). The expectation is that large providers will emerge in the 
European landscape and pursue international growth opportunities. In the 
longer term, they may be able to offer a significantly lower price point, but 
that is not certain. The challenge for all providers in the short term is to 
integrate their legacy systems in different countries and operate on one 
scale curve across countries as opposed to operating separate platforms 
with separate scale curves in each market.  
Non-bank payment providers (telecom operators, for example) are 
expanding in emerging segments (payments for music and movie 
downloads through mobile invoices). As customers become accustomed to 
the convenience of such payments, the mobile operator can charge a higher 
commission on each transaction. Banks are beginning to respond to this 
threat, leading to an increasingly competitive market in the future, notably 
with radio frequency identification technology becoming ubiquitous and 
the growing importance of the e-payments space (PayPal52 and Google 
Checkout have both applied for a banking licence in Europe and since mid-
2007 they have had a European passport). Another area of non-bank 
competition is money transfer services. Companies like MoneyGram, 
Western Union and Travelex are best positioned to expand their business 
among immigrants and low-income consumer groups.  
                                                      
52 Already, PayPal has 153 million user accounts (of which more than 35 million are 
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Until recently, the migration to new SEPA instruments (i.e. credit 
transfers) has been below expectations. Only 9.3% of the total credit 
transfers in Europe used a SEPA transfer in August 2010. These numbers 
mask substantial country-specific differences, with levels in Luxembourg 
(89.9%) and Cyprus (56.6%) at end-2009 well above the percentage 
considered the critical mass (around 50%), while migration in Germany or 
Ireland was marginal. 
For direct debit payments, it is still premature to make a 
comprehensive assessment. In August 2010, only 0.07% of all executed 
direct debit transactions were processed in the SEPA format. This is due to 
the fact that the launch of the SEPA direct debit scheme took place almost 
two years after the introduction of SEPA credit transfers and banks have 
only gradually been offering these new services. As of 1 November 2010, 
however, banks have been required by Regulation (EC) No. 924/200953 to be 
reachable for cross-border direct debits. 
The hesitation to migrate to SEPA is partly related to the impacts of 
the financial crisis on the financial industry, merchants and public 
authorities, all of which are reluctant to make the necessary investments to 
support the migration process.  
All in all, owing to the diverse payment systems, payment habits, 
payment providers’ cost structures and levels of cost efficiencies and 
pricing in the member states, it is important to ensure a systematic 
monitoring of the changes (volume and pricing) of the new SEPA 
instruments, not only for the banking and payment industry but also for 
the end-users of these instruments.  
2.2  Credit market  
The financial crisis has significantly impacted the previously robust growth 
of European retail credit markets.54 
                                                      
53 Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on cross-border payments in the Community and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001, OJ L 266, 9.10.2009. 
54 Retail credit encompasses all lending to the household sector (including non-
profit institutions serving households) and includes ‘consumer credit’, ‘loans for 
house purchases’ and ‘other lending’. According to definitions of the European 
Central Bank, consumer credit is “loans granted to households for personal use in 
the consumption of goods and services”. A loan for a house purchase is “credit 
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Figure 9 shows that in more than three-quarters of the EU member 
states, the loans granted to households in 2008 grew at a slower pace than 
in 2007, when the then-looming credit crunch started to drag on real annual 
growth rates.  
These aggregate numbers, however, hide major country-specific 
differences among EU member states: while the Eastern European 
countries experienced the fastest relative growth with double-digit figures 
of real increases despite the unfavourable macroeconomic conditions 
caused by the crisis, the more mature (Western European) markets 
witnessed rather moderate (or even negative) real growth.  
Figure 9. Real annual growth rates of total credit to households in the EU-27 
member states 
 
Source: ECRI (2009). 
Similar variations among European markets become evident when 
looking at the credit-to-GDP ratio (Figure 10). On an aggregate level, the 
growth of credit granted to European households has been outpacing the 
                                                                                                                                       
building and home improvements, [also covering] loans secured by residential 
property (i.e. mortgage loans) that are used for house purchase and, where 
identifiable, other loans for house purchase provided on a personal basis or 
secured by other types of asset[s]”. Other lending constitutes the residuum volume 
of “credit other than consumer credit and loans for house purchase that is 
extended to households for special purposes such as business needs, the 
procurement of office equipment, debt consolidation, education, the purchase of 
securities, etc.” (see the ECB’s website, “Glossary”, http://www.ecb.int/ 
home/glossary/html/index.en.html).  
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increase in GDP since 2000, causing a steady rise in the weighted, average 
relative indebtedness of European households. The ratio is currently 20% 
higher than ten years ago, having peaked at 64.44% the year before the 
crisis hit in 2007. But in 2008, the total credit to households as a percentage 
of GDP for the EU-27 contracted for the first time since 1998, declining 150 
basis points to 62.9%, a drop following a yearly average increase of 1.5 
percentage points over the previous ten years. 
Figure 10. Total credit to households in the EU-27 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: ECRI (2009). 
A closer look of the aggregate retail credit market in Europe shows 
that on average, loans for house purchases account for more than two-
thirds of the credit portfolio of European households. This is the case 
despite the end of an upward trend in 2008 in the share of housing loans, 
which peaked at 69.1% in 2007, after a 12% increase since 2001. The 
remaining third is split between consumer credit and other loans, the latter 
of which – among other things – are being used for debt consolidation. 
While all three segments of household credit contracted in the course of the 
worsening financial turmoil in the years 2007–08, growth rates dropped 
significantly in the area of loans for house purchases and consumer credit. 
Figure 11 illustrates this development and reflects that both segments even 
experienced negative growth in 2008.  
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Figure 11. Year-on-year growth of loans for house purchases and consumer credit 
in the EU 
 
Source: ECRI (2009). 
In the absence of a commonly accepted set of tools for the 
measurement of (retail credit) market integration, the considerably varying 
figures depicting current credit market realities (credit-to-GDP ratio, 
inflation-adjusted market growth rates, consumption financed by loans, the 
relative weight of loans for house purchases vs. consumer credit, etc.) 
within the EU can serve as a rough indicator for the level of credit market 
integration. Quantity-based indicators, such as the shares of cross-border 
loans extended by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) to non-banks as a 
percentage of total euro area provision of financial services, draw a 
similarly bleak picture: the numbers have barely risen from 3.1% in 1999 to 
only 5.7% as of end-2008.55  
Often, similar reactions to external shocks such as the drops in real 
annual growth rates across the majority of member states in the wake of the 
financial crisis are referred to in order to underline ongoing tendencies in 
retail credit market integration. In particular, analogous movements of 
national interest rates owing to certain shocks have been referred to 
frequently as the best way to measure integration – despite certain 
                                                      
55 Data are provided by the ECB and represent aggregate figures of lending to the 
non-bank private sector. Data on cross-border lending to households alone are not 
available.  
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shortcomings.56 But a look at the most recent data (Figure 12) illustrates 
strong dispersion in both the consumer credit and housing loan markets 
during the financial crisis with no signs of a declining trend in the near 
future. 
Figure 12. Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on loans to 
households (basis points) 
 
Source: ECB, Indicators of financial integration in the euro area. 
Retail credit markets have become more competitive over the last two 
decades – leading to increased choice and a broader range of (innovative) 
products available to a wider population for (on average) lower prices – but 
EU markets remain fragmented despite various attempts to quantify the 
potential benefits of a single market for credit. A study on the costs and 
benefits of the integration of EU mortgage markets,57 for example, estimates 
a rise of EU GDP by 0.7% and private consumption by 0.5% over a period 
of ten years (2005–15). Another study by Mercer Oliver Wyman and the 
                                                      
56 A pure analysis of price data may neglect variations in underlying credit risks or 
differences in product design, supplier efficiencies, goals for returns on 
investment, tax regimes, early repayment options and the general regulatory 
framework, etc. 
57 See the report on The Costs and Benefits of Integration of EU Mortgage Markets 
(European Commission, 2005c). 
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European Mortgage Federation estimates the benefits of EU mortgage 
market integration in the area of 0.12-0.24% of EU GDP per annum.58 
Notwithstanding these figures nor the predominant position of 
housing loans in the credit portfolio of European households, mortgage 
lending is currently not yet regulated at the European level. Concrete 
legislative action has so far only been taken in the area of consumer credit, 
when in May 2008 the new Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC)59 was 
adopted, aimed at achieving a higher level of consumer protection, 
enhancing responsible lending practices and harmonising the definition of 
the annual percentage rate (APR) of charge. To enhance the comparability 
of different offers, the directive foresees the provision of clear, 
understandable and comprehensive pre-contractual (and contractual) 
information in a standardised form (Standard European Consumer Credit 
Information).  
As regards mortgage lending, on the other hand, the Commission has 
been relying on a voluntary code of conduct since its inception in 
September 2002 as an appropriate means to supply information on housing 
loans and to encourage cross-border competition. According to the Third 
Progress Report on Implementation in the EU (EBIC, 2009), the code is adhered 
to in 20 member states (plus Norway), with coverage of between 90% and 
100% in 14 member states.  
The lack of concrete (proposals for further) regulation, however, 
should not be seen as mere inactivity on the part of the European 
Commission services in the area of retail credit. Ever since the adoption of 
the White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets (European 
Commission, 2007g), the Commission has been engaging in a variety of 
evaluations and stakeholder interactions, aimed at assessing the costs and 
benefits of further regulatory measures (see appendix 3). In late 2008, the 
Commission called upon a group of experts to come forward with concrete 
recommendations for doing away with existing barriers to the single 
market in the area of collecting and sharing credit data. Existing obstacles 
to cross-border access to borrowers’ credit data are seen to effectively 
hinder the cross-border provision of credit. The 2009 report by the Expert 
                                                      
58 See the Study on the Financial Integration of European Mortgage Markets by Mercer 
Oliver Wyman and the European Mortgage Federation (2003). 
59 Refer to Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 
87/102/EEC, OJ L 133/66, 22.5.2008. 38 | MARKETS AND POLICY ASSESSMENT 
Group on Credit Histories,60 having regard to privacy and other consumer 
protection concerns on the one side and the potential disproportional 
nature of costs and benefits on the other, rejected the option of creating a 
pan-European credit register or aligning all member states with an existing 
or newly established mechanism for sharing credit data. So far, no decision 
has been taken concerning the transposition of the Expert Group’s 
recommendations into guidelines or their implementation through further 
regulation. Additionally, a study by the European Commission on credit 
intermediaries in the internal market61 s h e d  l i g h t  o n  c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  
realities, the specific forms of potential consumer detriment as well as 
possible regulatory responses to structural market inefficiencies. With the 
latest public consultation on responsible lending and borrowing62 seeking 
advice and comments on options for registration and supervision of credit 
intermediaries, the Commission is currently evaluating the costs and 
benefits of future intervention in an until-now (on the EU level) practically 
unregulated market. 
The present political uncertainty surrounding the next steps in 
developing the European retail credit market is aggravated by the broad 
nature of the ambitious responsible lending and borrowing agenda of the 
European Commission.63 The latter ranges from questions concerning pre-
contractual information, product standardisation/certification, the 
facilitation of creditworthiness checks and the (mandatory?) introduction of 
supplementary suitability checks to issues regarding marketing, 
advertising and financial advice as well as the previously mentioned 
operation of credit intermediaries. As re-opening the Consumer Credit 
Directive dossier is deemed politically too difficult (with transposition still 
underway, having exceeded the June 2010 deadline), the question arises of 
how to best introduce legislative measures, if necessary, in the (non-
)existing framework.  
                                                      
60 See European Commission (2009b). 
61 See the Study on Credit Intermediaries in the Internal Market (European 
Commission, 2009c). 
62 For further information, see the European Commission’s Internal Market 
website, “Responsible lending and borrowing”, “Consultation on Responsible 
Lending and Borrowing the EU” (2009) (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/finservices-retail/credit/responsible_lending_en.htm#consultation).  
63 Derived from the recommendations in the CEPS/ECRI (2011) Task Force report, 
A new retail credit regime for Europe: Setting the right priorities (forthcoming). INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 39 
2.3  Retail investment market  
The retail investment fund industry in Europe grew steadily until 2007 to 
reach the level of €7,909 billion. The year 2008 marked a break in the trend 
due to the financial crisis and the unfortunate events in the financial 
markets (the demise of Lehman Brothers and the scandal linked to Madoff 
funds, in which major European fund managers had invested) (see Figure 
13). The growth of this market cannot ignore the inherent market failings, 
which include the asymmetries of information that exist between investors 
and the industry/sellers and the intrinsic conflict-of-interest problem when 
designing and distributing these products.  
Figure 13. Net assets of European investment funds (€ billions) 
 
Source: Efama (2009). 
The EU passport has certainly facilitated the quantity of cross-border 
sales, a chief indicator for assessing market integration. For example, the 
number of foreign funds accessible domestically was larger than the 
number of domestic funds in the majority of the EU-15 countries in 2005 
(see Figure 14). Still, the quality of this varied supply left much to desire. 
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Figure 14. Number of funds available in national markets (31 December 2005) 
 
Source: ZEW (2006). 
EU regulation governing the free provision of financial services in the 
asset management industry across borders under home country rules 
started with the UCITS Directive of 1985 (85/611/EEC). The UCITS 
Directive introduced harmonised product regulation for investment funds 
that were allowed for cross-border sales in the EU (and the countries of the 
European Economic Area). It was followed in the early 1990s with 
directives defining the terms under which the banking, insurance and 
investment services sectors could ‘passport’ their services across the EU on 
the basis of authorisation from their home state regulator. The UCITS 
Directive was amended and expanded in 2002 and later in 2009, to become 
more of a horizontal asset-management directive to reflect the increasing 
convergence of the core sectors of the financial services industry. An 
agreement was also reached in 2002 on the last outstanding piece of 
regulation on the free provision of cross-border services in the financial 
services sector, the Pension Funds Directive (2003/41/EC). In the meantime, 
the new wave of the FSAP had started to come into effect, most importantly 
with the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 2006/48/EC). 
The 1985 UCITS Directive paved the way for the cross-border sale of 
investment funds in the EU. Subject to some general criteria regarding 
authorisation, legal structure, investment policies and disclosure, units of 
open-ended funds that invest in transferable securities could be sold freely 
throughout the EU. The 2002 UCITS amendments expanded the scope of 
activities that were possible under the UCITS I Directive. One directive – 
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the UCITS III Product Directive – widens the investment possibilities of 
funds to include instruments like derivatives and allows for new forms of 
funds, such as funds of funds, money market funds, cash funds or index 
tracker funds. A second directive – the UCITS III Management Directive – 
detailed minimum standards, including the introduction of a minimum 
level of own funds to be held by a fund management company for 
prudential purposes, and broadened the permissible activities of the fund 
management company. It also introduced a simplified prospectus, which 
provides for key factual information about a UCITS to be presented to 
investors in an accessible and uniform format. The UCITS III Directive 
grants the ‘single license’  to fund management companies in the broad 
sense of the word. It comprises not only the management of investment 
funds – i.e. the core services – but also other activities related to portfolio 
management, such as pension funds for individuals, investment advice, 
safekeeping (custody) and administration of investment funds, which are 
seen as non-core or ancillary.64 
In 2007, the European Commission proposed a further set of 
amendments to the directive. UCITS IV was formally adopted by the EU in 
April 2009, and it is expected to be implemented by July 2011 at the latest. 
The latest amendments formally allow for a genuine European passport for 
UCITS management companies, enabling the separation between the 
location of the management company from the place where funds are 
registered. UCITS IV facilitates the cross-border mergers of UCITS, which 
will make it possible to increase the average size of European funds. In the 
same vein, UCITS IV allows for master-feeder structures, which have so far 
been specifically excluded due to fund diversification rules.65 All these 
measures should allow for entity pooling, generate scale economies and 
thus contribute to a consolidation of the sector, which should serve the end-
users of funds. UCITS IV further eases the cross-border marketing of 
UCITS by simplifying administrative procedures: there will be immediate 
market access once the authorisation has been granted by the country of 
                                                      
64 Other forms of portfolio management, i.e. the management of pension fund 
portfolios or those of individuals, are presented as a form of derogation from the 
central objective of the Directive, which is the management of investment funds as 
authorised under the Directive (Art. 5).  
65 A feeder UCITS is a UCITS or an investment compartment thereof that invests at 
least 85% of its assets in one other UCITS, called the master UCITS. 42 | MARKETS AND POLICY ASSESSMENT 
origin of the UCITS. The host country will be able to monitor the 
commercial documents but not block access to the market. 
UCITS IV also improves investor information  by creating a 
standardised summary information document: ‘key investor information’ 
(KII). This should make it easier for the consumer to understand the 
product. The KII will replace the simplified prospectus of UCITS III.  
Notwithstanding the recent decline, UCITS is considered a European 
regulatory success and a worldwide brand. It started from a limited basis in 
1985, covering product rules for equity, bond and money market funds, 
which remain intact in the latest amendments, although the scope of the 
directive has been considerably enlarged. The UCITS III Product Directive 
signalled a first expansion, and allowed for funds investing in money 
market instruments, bank deposits, financial derivatives, index funds, units 
of other UCITS and non-UCITS funds (funds of funds). 
More recently, a new regulatory initiative was launched by the 
European Commission66 to cover the packaged retail investment products 
(PRIPS), which offer exposure to underlying financial assets in a packaged 
form and which modify that exposure compared with direct holdings. If 
well designed in terms of investor protection, such a regulatory initiative is 
expected to foster growth in this market.  
Finally it is also important to mention the role of the Investor 
Compensation Scheme (ICS).67 The ICS was adopted in 1997 to complement 
the Investment Services Directive,68 which has since been replaced by 
MiFID.69 The ICS has provided investors with some protection through the 
possibility to be compensated in specific circumstances where the 
investment firm is unable to return the money or the financial instruments 
that it holds on the client’s behalf. In the aftermath of the crisis, this 
                                                      
66 Consultation was held by the Commission services on the legislative steps for the 
PRIPS Initiative, January 2011.  
67 See Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 
1997 on investor compensation schemes, OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22. 
68 Refer to Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in 
the securities field, OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, pp. 27–46. 
69 See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 
April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 
85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 
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Directive was revisited to better protect investors (e.g. the increase of the 
level of compensation from €20,000 to €50,000 and other refinements 
related to the funding principles, the borrowing last resort mechanisms 
among national schemes, co-insurance, payout delays and investor 
information) and to better align itself with the MiFID provisions. The 
Directive may have to be revisited again in the wake of the adoption of the 
PRIPS Directive, which may eventually reopen the debate about the 
relevance of an EU solution to protect investors in the EU.  
2.4  Overall assessment  
Tables 4 and 5 provide a summarised assessment of the current market and 
regulatory status and the proposed way forward in the retail financial 
services market in Europe.  
Table 4. Policy assessment and way forward in retail financial services 
Area Diagnosis    Latest 
policy/market 
initiatives 
Achievements/ 
limits  
Way forward 
Payments Very  low 
cross-border 
transactions  
Payment 
Service 
Directive 
(PSD)  
Legal 
harmonisation 
of payment 
market  
 
Partial 
implementation 
of SEPA  
Continuous 
monitoring 
(implementation of 
the PSD and 
pricing 
transparency) is 
required 
Current 
accounts  
Large 
divergence in 
pricing  
 
Low 
transparency 
and high 
level of 
complexity  
Self-regulation   Low customer 
mobility and 
very high 
switching costs 
in general  
 
Current account 
is tied with 
other retail 
financial 
services 
(mortgage and 
consumer 
credit)  
 
Consumer 
credit 
Growth in 
national 
markets 
 
Cross-border 
supply is 
limited 
Consumer 
Credit 
Directive  
Responsible 
lending rules 
 
More transparency 
and simplicity of 
offers  
Mortgage 
credit 
Forthcoming 
measures on 
mortgage 
credit  44 | MARKETS AND POLICY ASSESSMENT 
Table 4. cont’d 
Retail 
investments 
Cross-border 
supply 
growth of 
UCITS  
UCITS I, II, III, 
IV  
 
PRIPS  
 
Simplification of 
prospectus  
 
Links with 
MiFID (investor 
protection)  
Restrictions on 
complex and 
risky products 
should be 
considered 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Table 5. Proposed comprehensive framework to regulate retail financial services  
Area/rules   Disclosure of 
costs and risks  
 
Availability 
and 
comparability 
of information 
Consumer 
protection  
Enforcement of 
regulation on 
unfair 
commercial 
practices  
Redress 
(collective and 
individual) 
Protection in 
case of crisis  
Deposit 
guarantee 
schemes  
Investment 
compensatio
n schemes  
Current 
accounts/payments/savings  
Yes  Yes   Yes  
Consumer credit  Yes  Yes   n.a. 
Mortgage  credit Yes  Yes n.a.   
UCITS  Yes   Yes  Yes  
PRIPS  Yes   Yes   Yes*  
* Not yet considered.  
Source: Author’s compilation.  | 45 
 
3.  CHALLENGES AHEAD  
o promote the internal market for retail financial services, it is 
essential to respond to the related political challenges that lie ahead 
in ensuring financial safety for retail consumers and to enhance 
consumer protection at the EU level.  
3.1  Financial safety 
One specific aspect of the financial safety net that has been in the spotlight 
concerns the deposit guarantee schemes – which provide protection for 
retail depositors so that if a credit institution fails, they are able to recover 
at least a portion of their bank deposits. Deposit guarantee schemes also 
serve to prevent runs on banks, and if properly designed, to facilitate bank 
closures. The run on the British bank Northern Rock in September 2008 was 
clear evidence of the failure of such schemes to fulfil one of the aims. This 
leads us to consider how to improve their institutional and operational 
design.  
The 1994 Directive (94/19/EC) on deposit guarantee schemes 
provided a minimum harmonisation background for establishing deposit-
guarantee schemes in the member states. While the criteria used in the 
directive were generally harmonised in terms of the scope (the exclusion of 
the interbank and corporate deposits) and the minimum coverage (fixed at 
€20,000 per person per bank), they fell short of ensuring a sound deposit-
guarantee system in Europe. Indeed, the directive was implemented 
unevenly in the member states as a result of divergent interpretations of its 
provisions. There are clear differences in the legal frameworks, the 
administration of the schemes, the extent of coverage, the co-insurance 
practices and the sources of funding. In light of the continuing trends of 
cross-border banking these divergences in implementation present major 
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challenges in terms of protecting retail banking customers. While foreign 
branches of EU banks are covered by the home deposit-guarantee scheme, 
foreign subsidiaries of EU banks are covered by the host deposit-guarantee 
scheme. The home and host schemes can be intrinsically different, and 
depositors are not necessarily aware of such differences and in the majority 
of the cases are not protected evenly. The situation grows more complex in 
the case of branches of non-EU banks and in countries where no deposit 
guarantee scheme exists. Not only does this raise competitive 
considerations and can it be the source of potential conflicts of interest 
between the host and the home countries’ authorities, but it also adds 
further confusion and complications for depositors, particularly if a bank 
failure occurs.  
These limitations were acknowledged by the European Commission 
in a Communication70 in November 2006, less than a year before the 
eruption of the crisis. The conclusions concurred that changes should not 
be made to the directive, but instead work should focus on providing some 
interpretative guidance and recommendations on the main aspects of the 
directive.71  
The financial crisis has put into doubt the adequacy of the existing 
national schemes and the wisdom of the European Commission’s decision 
not to amend the directive earlier, while putting pressure on governments 
in the member states to take individual, uncoordinated actions to help 
restore confidence in their domestic markets. These individual actions have 
prompted EU policy-makers to revise the original directive to prevent any 
competitive distortions. Amendments have since been put forward, more 
importantly to reassure depositors than to promote the convergence of 
deposit guarantee schemes. The amendments entail revisions in three key 
areas: a) an increase of the minimum coverage level (from a minimum of 
€20,000 to at least €50,000 and within a further year to at least €100,000),72 b) 
                                                      
70 See European Commission (2006e) (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
bank/docs/guarantee/comm9419_en.pdf). 
71 More specifically, it would include the definition of deposits and scope of 
coverage, co-insurance, topping-up arrangements, the exchange of information 
requirements, the risk-based contributions to deposit guarantee schemes (DGS), 
the transferability/refundability of DGS contributions, consumer information and 
advertising.  
72 In the compromise package that the Council published on 24 November 2008, 
which was agreed on 2 December 2008, changes were introduced to the INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 47 
 
a reduction of the payout delay to a maximum of three days and c) the 
termination of co-insurance.  
The 2008 amendments to Directive 94/19/EC provide useful lessons 
for a fundamental review of the adequacy of the existing schemes and for 
the discussion of possible improvements to level the playing field in 
Europe73 and ensure that European retail banking customers enjoy the 
same level of protection within the internal market. So far, this is not yet 
the case; instead, the fragmentation of deposit insurance in Europe and the 
low level of customer awareness act as impediments to further integration 
in the retail banking market.  
3.2  Consumer protection  
As it stands, markets have a strong local orientation and removing 
important consumer-protection measures in a well-intended effort to 
dismantle perceived barriers to the single market risks regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulatory standards could fall to the lowest common denominator, which 
would ultimately undermine the single market. A maximum 
harmonisation approach has limited use in this regard and the Commission 
must commit to ensuring that robust and consistent minimum standards 
exist in relation to the provision of information; the quality of financial 
advice; regulations, legal protection and collective redress; and professional 
standards. Other approaches, such as the 28th regime, may seem unrealistic, 
as in the latter case it will certainly face political resistance (see appendix 4). 
It is self-evident that if the single market is to stand any chance of 
developing as envisaged, i.e. towards more integration in retail financial 
services markets, then consumer confidence in these markets is a 
prerequisite. It follows that this confidence depends on consumers being 1) 
financially educated and 2) protected through adequately enforced 
regulations, and having easy access to redress along with a strong voice in 
policy-making.  
                                                                                                                                       
Commission’s original proposal with respect to coverage levels. The timeline for 
increasing the coverage to €100,000 was extended by two years (from 31 December 
2009 to 31 December 2011), subject to a report by the European Commission to 
evaluate the impact of such an increase and the necessity for this amount to 
become a harmonised coverage level in the Community.  
73 See Ayadi and Lastra (2010).  48 | CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Financial education is useful and if carried out properly, can be 
beneficial. The challenge is to determine the extent of financial capability 
that an average consumer should be expected to have to be able to behave 
rationally in the complex financial market. Still, it should be born in mind 
that financial literacy cannot replace well-enforced regulations and 
adequate consumer protection rules to ensure access, fair play and 
adequate information for consumers.  
Indeed, implementing and enforcing existing directives (for example, 
those on Consumer Credit and Undertakings in Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities, UCITS) and ensuring regulatory consistency in 
other areas, such as mortgage credit and packaged retail investment 
products, will not only help to achieve regulatory coherence and 
convergence but most importantly will enhance market confidence. 
Regulation must be enforced, as is the case for competition policy. 
Competition authorities have the power to levy substantial fines on market 
participants who breach competition law. This means that firms’ senior 
management, and crucially institutional investors,74 are very aware of the 
risks of breaching competition law, which has a very powerful disciplining 
effect on corporate behaviour. The approach to enforcing regulation needs 
to be revisited and complemented by a credible system of sanctions if rules 
are breached. The role of the new European Supervisory Authorities is 
paramount to achieve this.  
In addition, consumers must have access to the necessary and 
relevant information on all retail financial products supplied by financial 
services providers in the 27 member states to allow them to make informed, 
effective choices and decisions. If access to information is to be effective as 
a policy tool, it is important that the information disclosed to consumers is 
easily available, consistent, easily understandable and comparable, and that 
it covers the risks, costs, features, terms and conditions, and redress associated 
with the product and service. As soon as regulatory and consumer policy 
frameworks are maximally harmonised, an observatory of retail financial 
services is to be established to improve transparency and to ensure 
comparability among products and services. On the supply side, financial 
institutions, advisers/intermediaries and other players should be required 
to operate with a generally high duty of care in assessing consumers’ needs 
and level of financial sophistication (where possible), so that appropriate 
                                                      
74 One can also add other influential players, such as brokers and company 
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advice and recommendations are given. Mis-selling, unduly high prices, 
unfair commercial practices and the provision of improper information to 
customers must be banned and legally sanctioned. The sales rules under 
the Markets in Financial Instruments and the Insurance Mediation 
Directives must be properly enforced. An annual consumer satisfaction 
barometer should be part of the strategies of financial providers and must 
become part of their annual reports. All in all, an EU ethical code of 
conduct should be agreed and enforced by the profession in close 
consultation with consumer organisations. Responsibility for enforcing the 
code should be taken by the boards. Consumer satisfaction is as important 
as that of other stakeholders. Furthermore, the Commission should 
produce clear guidelines about i) consumer needs assessments (for 
example, information gathering, transparency level and adequacy of 
financial services) and ii) recognised professional standards to ensure that 
intermediaries/advisers apply consistently high standards in their 
domestic and cross-border services. 
Finally, the interests of end-users of financial services (consumers, 
pensioners, small enterprises, retail investors and so forth) must be better 
represented at the EU level. It is therefore critical that the EU increases the 
resources available to advocates of end-users and develops ideas on how to 
create a more level playing field during the policy-making process in 
future. Capacity building could be complemented by the set-up of a 
European consumer protection agency in the medium term when evidence 
of more retail financial market integration is apparent. Its mandate would 
be to protect European end-users from deceptive practices by the financial 
industry and to enforce relevant regulations in retail financial services 
(currently under the mandate of the three European Supervisory 
Authorities). The agency should be funded under the EU’s budget.  50 |  
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APPENDIX 1. MAJOR OBSTACLES TO  
CROSS-BORDER CONSOLIDATION 
n 2005, the European Commission conducted a survey (European 
Commission, 2005e) to assess the extent of unjustified obstacles to cross-
border consolidation. The results confirmed the existence of significant 
obstacles that prevent a full exploitation of scale economies in the internal 
market. In other words, EU financial institutions fail to extract the benefits 
of cross-border fixed-cost synergies, especially when compared with 
potential cost synergies resulting from domestic transactions.75 The reasons 
behind the lack of a business rationale for cross-border consolidation are 
threefold: 
1)  Supervisory and reporting matters for cross-border institutions 
Obstacles related to multiple supervisory requirements for cross-
border activities ranked in first position as an explanation for the lack 
of fixed-cost synergies for the large and very large institutions. More 
than 90% of the large institutions (assets of between €1 billion and 
€100 billion) pointed to the constraints of multiple reporting 
requirements and divergence of supervisory practices.76 For the very 
large institutions (assets of over €100 billion) this ranked second (with 
more than 30% of the respondents in this category), behind the 
overarching issue of non-overlapping fixed costs (around 55%). It 
ranked in the first position for smaller institutions. These results are 
not surprising, since most of the very large institutions already have 
cross-border businesses, and should therefore already be familiar 
with the supervision of cross-border activities. 
                                                      
75 It is interesting to note that the share of fixed costs in total costs has markedly 
increased in the financial sector over the last few years. For instance, one study 
estimates that, in banking, the proportion of fixed costs has increased from 10-15% 
in the early 1990s to about 25-30% today (see the study, European Banking 
Consolidation by Morgan Stanley & Co. International Ltd and Mercer Oliver 
Wyman, 2005). 
76 Note that respondents were able to select more than one answer. 
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Because of multiple reporting requirements by different 
national authorities, it is more difficult for a cross-border company to 
streamline its back-office operations. By contrast, within a domestic 
group, those functions can be more easily combined, leading to 
potentially greater business efficiency. 
2)  Legal and tax impediments to corporate expansion and 
reorganisation 
Another reason identified for a lack of cross-border synergies is that it 
is difficult to reorganise business operations on a cross-border basis, 
as one would do in a domestic group.  
Among the list of potential obstacles to cross-border 
reorganisation, nearly all the financial institutions that took part in 
the survey identified the taxation on dividends as a significant one. 
Commercial banks also pointed at other obstacles that could impede 
companies from streamlining and reorganising their business 
functions on a cross-border basis: differences in employment 
legislation (in third position, with around 30% of the respondents in 
this category), legal structures of the companies and possible risks of 
double taxation resulting from exit taxes on capital gains. The issue of 
inter-group VAT was also among the obstacles most often mentioned. 
Some of these issues are specific to the financial sector, such as the 
problem of inter-group VAT, due to its partial non-recoverability, 
and also the variations in the legal structures of companies, which are 
sometimes more constraining in the financial sector than in other 
economic sectors. Other obstacles are not specific to the financial 
sector, but they add to the specific ones and further reduce the 
economic attractiveness of a cross-border deal. 
3)  Difficulties in selling the same products across countries 
Small and medium-sized institutions primarily identified product-
related obstacles, notably the differences in tax treatment (either 
discriminatory or resulting from specific domestic tax breaks – more 
than 80% of small institutions and around 45% of medium-sized 
institutions). Uncertainties as to the VAT treatment applicable in 
other member states were also seen as an obstacle.  
More generally, the smaller institutions pointed to the 
disparities among countries in the product mix, which limit the scope 
for cross-border cost synergies. As explained above, these differences 
may be partially explained by differences in tax regimes. More deeply INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 61 
 
rooted factors, such as history (consumers being used to specific 
products) or culture (especially linguistic considerations) may also 
come into play. The survey results additionally identified legal 
factors, such as divergent consumer protection rules or differences in 
private law.  
Other obstacles relate to environmental factors that discourage 
or block cross-border transactions, such as political interference in the 
process and misuse of supervisory powers. These factors create an 
unfavourable environment for cross-border transactions, which may 
dissuade market participants from launching a cross-border bid or 
block them once they have launched one. 
For instance, the following issues are mentioned in the 
European Commission’s (2005e) survey, more often by companies 
having past experience in cross-border M&As: political interference 
(nearly 30%), misuse of supervisory powers (nearly 20%), or limits or 
controls on foreign participation (nearly 20%). Similarly, political 
interference ranks fourth among the companies having been blocked 
in the process of a cross-border transaction. 
It is difficult to characterise these obstacles with certitude, as 
they may take very different forms, from legal measures hampering 
or preventing acquisitions to direct political intervention in the 
transaction process, indirect influence at the various decision-making 
levels, or abuse of otherwise legitimate legal provisions or 
discretionary powers.  
Industry conveyed a message that these obstacles can only be 
tackled with the strong political will to i) establish a cross-border 
regulatory framework for financial institutions, with a strong lead 
supervisor model; ii) build on integrated infrastructures, such as 
SEPA and clearing and settlement systems; iii) allow optimal cross-
border organisation (outsourcing, tax penalties (VAT), transfer 
pricing and exit tax); and iv) harmonise consumer protection rules.  
Following the 2005 Commission survey, policy initiatives were 
taken to improve the prudential assessment process for M&As in 
financial services. These initiatives included the introduction of a 
transparent notification and decision-making process; shorter 
deadlines during the examination process; a limited use of stopping-
of-the-clock under clear and specific conditions; and clarified and 62 | APPENDICES 
fully harmonised criteria to assess the suitability of the acquirer 
throughout. In March 2007, the related amendments to the following 
directives were agreed: the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC), the 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive (92/49/EEC), the Recast Life 
Assurance Directive (2002/83/EC), the Reinsurance Directive 
(2005/68/EC) and the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments 
(2006/48/EC).  | 63 
APPENDIX 2. 
 TAX IMPEDIMENTS TO FINANCIAL MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
iscal measures would seem to be among the most crucial elements 
that hamper the integration of the financial sector in the EU. A 
common factor is that cross-border groups are put in a more 
disadvantageous position than domestic groups because of the application 
of a certain fiscal regime. Another commonality is the way that the EU has 
had to respond with these problems, which has led to a patchy and case-
by-case response to the tax impediments standing in the way of financial 
market integration. Owing to the particularities of EU tax policy, where 
Council decisions can only be adopted by a unanimous vote, the main 
policy tools are the European Commission’s infringement procedures or 
rulings in cases brought before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Far 
from addressing the issues in a systematic manner, these actions lead to a 
patchy line of defence against the tax obstacles. 
Becoming a cross-border group is associated with a number of 
problems that would not arise for a domestic firm. One of these issues is a 
multi-national group’s inability to offset losses incurred in one country 
from profits earned in another. Since losses are not taxable, loss offsetting 
actually reduces a group’s total taxable income and tax obligations. Most 
EU member states recognise domestic tax grouping, which allows loss 
offsetting for qualified groups of firms within the same member state.77 Yet 
such an option is often not available on a cross-border basis.78 In 
consequence, multinational groups within the EU may at times lack the tax 
advantages available to purely domestic groups.  
                                                      
77 Currently, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Slovakia are among the EU member states that do not have a group taxation 
regime, enabling qualifying groups to compute their tax liabilities on a combined 
and consolidated basis (Endres et al., 2007, Table 90).  
78 Non-resident subsidiaries can be a part of a tax group in Austria, Denmark, 
France and Italy (Endres et al., 2007, Table 94).  
F64 | APPENDICES 
The European Commission adopted a Communication in 2006 
showing its willingness to end the discriminatory treatment of losses 
emanating from a foreign group entity.79 Member states were urged to 
review their tax systems in compliance with the freedom of establishment 
principle provided for by the EC Treaty. Since then, the Commission has 
initiated a number of infringement procedures by requesting various 
member states to allow cross-border loss offsetting.80, 81  
A closely related issue to loss offsetting stems from compliance costs 
arising from anti-transfer pricing rules. Tax authorities around the world 
rely on a variety of mechanisms to ensure that the pricing of these 
transactions actually reflects the underlying value of the good or service 
provided.82 The concern is that by applying an artificially high price, 
                                                      
79 The Communication (COM(2006) 824) and its technical annexes (SEC(2006) 1690) 
were published on 19 December 2006 (European Commission, 2006c). Among 
other things, the Communication highlighted the technical difficulties associated 
with the administrative delays arising from the cross-border transfers of losses. 
The Communication followed the ECJ’s highly influential ruling in Marks & 
Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) (Case C-446/03 of 13 
December 2005), where the Court ruled that the UK’s ban on cross-border loss 
relief was disproportionate and asked for provisions to be set in place to grant 
relief for cross-border losses of a subsidiary established in another EU member 
state. 
80 Since 2006, the Commission has formally asked the UK and Germany to end the 
discriminatory rules applied to cross-border losses (see Press Release IP/08/1365 
on the UK, European Commission, 2008c; and IP/07/1547 on Germany, European 
Commission, 2007d). In the German case, the proceedings were closed in May 2009 
after Germany changed its legislation. As for the UK, the Commission’s argument 
rested on the complaint that the UK had failed to properly implement the ECJ’s 
2005 ruling in the Marks & Spencer case.  
81 A more concrete solution is through the completion of the EU’s common 
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) project, which was set in motion in 2001 
(COM(2001) 582 – see European Commission, 2001). The regime gives qualifying 
groups the option to pool their Community-wide profits. Once consolidated, the 
profits are shared among member states according to a set of apportionment rules, 
which are then subjected to taxes. The regime has not materialised, mostly owing 
to strong resistance from certain member states. For a more detailed discussion on 
how CCCTB could lift some of the tax barriers that impede the spread of cross-
border firms within EU, see CEPS (2008).  
82 One of the most common means of enforcement is the arm’s length principle. First 
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multinational corporations can shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to 
low-tax jurisdictions.83 The mechanisms put in place to combat such 
practices generate significant compliance costs for all cross-border groups.84 
Purely domestic groups that operate within a single tax regime, however, 
are not subject to a similar scrutiny since shifting profits would not be 
beneficial.  
Cross-border restructuring is also problematic when member states 
apply exit taxes on assets leaving a member state. By charging one-time 
taxes on departing assets, tax authorities effectively discriminate against 
cross-border structures and contradict the freedom of establishment and 
capital movement principles enshrined in the Treaty. Some illegitimate 
uses of exit taxes have been addressed by the 1990 Taxation of Mergers 
Directive (90/434/EEC).85 In 2006, the Commission adopted a 
Communication86 renewing its willingness to uproot the use of exit taxes 
during the restructuring of taxes. Since then, member states have either 
rescinded or have been asked by the Commission to abolish the use of exit 
taxes.87 
                                                                                                                                       
(OECD, 2005), the principle requires that the intra-group transfers reflect the 
market prices upon which a pair of unrelated parties would have agreed.  
83 Indeed, transfer pricing can make certain types of cross-border structures more 
beneficial. For example, corporations can setup or acquire ’holding companies’ in 
low-tax countries, which can be used to store the group’s profits. These profits can 
then be redistributed within the group by dividend distributions, which are 
exempted from taxation in the destination (high-tax) countries through the Parent–
Subsidiary Directive (2003/123/EC).  
84 According to a survey published by the European Commission (2004c), transfer 
pricing is an important obstacle to cross-border activity for over 70% of the 
respondents. Once again, CCCTB would make transfer pricing obsolete, as 
transfers would have no impact on the total pooled amount.  
85 See Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of 
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of 
shares concerning companies of different Member States, OJ L 225, 20.8.1990. 
86 See COM(2006) 825 final (European Commission, 2006d). 
87 Most recently, the Commission has asked Sweden to change its tax provisions 
imposing an exit tax on companies leaving the country on 18 September 2008 (in 
Press Release IP/08/1533 – see European Commission, 2008d).  66 | APPENDICES 
The differential tax treatment of dividends within the EU is another 
serious impediment to cross-border business, especially in the financial 
services sector.88 In general, dividends are taxed twice; once through the 
corporate tax on profits, and a second time through the tax on shareholder 
earnings. Some member states address double taxation by granting the 
shareholders some form of relief.89 One common mechanism is to impute 
credits based on taxes paid or withheld. In these cases, discrimination may 
arise from granting credits only for domestic dividends or by applying a 
higher withholding tax to foreign shareholders.90 In either case, domestic 
distributions receive more relief than foreign distributions, leading to an 
obstacle to cross-border investment.  
Several mechanisms have been put in place to address the differential 
treatment of cross-border dividends. A few countries maintain bilateral 
agreements (the so-called ‘DTAs’ or double tax agreements) that 
homogenise the taxation of dividends. More generally, the ECJ and the 
European Commission have acted to end the discriminatory treatment of 
dividends on the grounds that such practices do not comply with the 
principle of the free movement of capital set out in Article 56 of the EC 
Treaty. Since 2006, the European Commission has been very active in 
uprooting the discriminatory treatment of dividend payments to foreign 
corporations (including financial institutions such as pension funds) and 
has started legislative action against a number of countries, including 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. Several of these countries have been referred to the ECJ.91 
A final challenge for financial integration stems from the way that 
exemptions have been granted under the Sixth VAT Directive of 1977 
                                                      
88 The European Commission’s survey (2005b) uncovered that the discriminatory 
treatment of dividend distributions is one of the major tax-related obstacles faced 
by financial institutions across Europe.  
89 Group distributions are, to a large extent, exempted from income taxation by the 
(amended) Parent–Subsidiary Directive (2003/123/EC).  
90 For the latter case, the discrimination may be direct, as in different withholding 
rates, or indirect, such as income tax credits based on withholding taxes paid.  
91 For more details on the Commission’s actions, see the list of infringement cases 
on the European Commission’s website, Taxation and Customs Union, 
“Infringement cases by policy area”, 1 February 2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/common/infringements/infringement_cases/bypolicy/index_ 
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(77/388/EEC).92 Under the directive, financial institutions have been 
exempt from VAT because of inherent difficulties in measuring value 
added in the sector. The exemption is treated differently by EU countries, 
leading to potential complexities, uncertainties and hidden costs. In effect, 
the exemption often means that taxes paid on inputs cannot be fully 
recovered. Indeed, a 2006 study found that the exemption was not applied 
homogenously, with the share of recovered VAT ranging from a low of 0% 
to a high of 74%.93 Another study94 showed that some member states 
allowed certain financial institutions the option of taxing certain 
transactions, leading to large discrepancies among member states in the 
way services are exempt.95  
In responding to these challenges, in 2007 the Commission proposed 
a directive aimed at allowing financial institutions to tax their services.96 In 
cross-border transactions, much like in domestic cases, the option to tax 
overcomes the non-recoverability of input taxes by allowing financial 
institutions to subject their services to VAT. The business clients of financial 
institutions may also redeem the taxes on purchased services, preventing 
the cascading effect and ensuring that tax costs do not inflate along the 
supply chain and across borders. Although the proposed directive on VAT 
taxation is a promising solution in principle, the Commission’s impact 
assessment97 found that the implementation of the option to tax will lead to 
consequential tax revenue losses as financial institutions cherry-pick 
between opting in and out of the VAT. Moreover, there may be 
“political/social sensitivities associated with taxing consumers” not 
considered by the assessment. Nevertheless, the Commission has shown its 
                                                      
92 See the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of 
value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ L 145, 13.6.1977), which was 
transposed into national laws by 1 January 1978.  
93 See PwC (2006). The study covered a total 22 institutions, headquartered in 7 EU 
member states with subsidiaries in all of the 25 EU member states.  
94 See IBFD (2006).  
95 This right emanates from Art. 13(C)(b) of Sixth VAT Directive, which allows 
member states a right of option for taxation.  
96 The Commission’s proposal for a directive (COM(2007) 747) to modernise the 
VAT was issued on 28 November 2007 (see European Commission, 2007e).  
97 See SEC(2007) 1554 (European Commission, 2008e).  68 | APPENDICES 
preference for the opt-in clause as the closest solution to treating financial 
services.98 Since 2008, the directive has been the subject of lengthy 
discussions at the Council, challenged by the arguments of several member 
states in line with the view that the changes may lead to substantial 
revenue losses, which has been a particularly divisive topic since the onset 
of the financial crisis.  
                                                      
98 The Commission’s position was also made explicit in the Commission’s 
background paper requested by the Council presidency, TAXUD/2414/08 
(European Commission, 2008f). | 69 
APPENDIX 3.  
INTEGRATION IN MORTGAGE LOAN MARKETS – 
OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS 
Table A3. Integration in mortgage loan markets – Obstacles and solutions 
Problem areas 
Cross-
border 
activity 
Product 
diversity 
Consumer 
confidence 
Customer 
mobility 
Commission’s 
related actions 
Legislation           
Applicable law – 
uncertainty about the 
law applicable to 
mortgage contracts 
X   X   
Application of 
‘Rome I 
Convention’ a)  to 
mortgage contracts 
Application of 
rules from the 
country of 
property location 
to collateral 
Pre-contractual 
information: 
• insufficient and 
complex information; 
• non-comparability of 
information (e.g. of the 
annual percentage rate 
of charge, APRC); 
• provision of 
information at different 
times (in advance or 
together with a binding 
offer); and 
• lack of credible 
monitoring and 
enforcement of 
information 
requirements for the 
code of conduct on 
home loans. 
X   X  X 
Completion of the 
revision of the 
European 
Standard 
Information Sheet 
Preparation of an 
APRC study 
Preparation of a 
cost-benefit 
analysis 
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Table A3. cont’d 
Early repayment: 
• different rules on 
when and under what 
circumstances 
consumers can repay 
early; and 
• different rules on the 
compensation 
chargeable in the event 
of early repayment. 
X X  X  X 
Assessment of 
policy options  
Interest rate restrictions 
(to prevent exorbitant 
interest rates):  
• presence of caps 
(ceilings) on the level 
and variability of 
interest rates; and 
• restrictions on use of 
compound interest rates. 
X X     
Preparation of a 
study on 
interest rate 
restrictions 
Obligation to be a credit 
institution: 
 requirement in some 
countries to become a 
credit institution in 
order to engage in 
mortgage lending and 
carry out day-to-day 
servicing of the 
mortgage loan. 
X X     
Preparation of a 
study on non-
credit 
institutions  
Mortgage funding         
Continuation of 
the work of the 
Mortgage 
Funding Expert 
Group 
Reception of 
market 
feedback on 
complex 
financial tools 
Feasibility 
study on the 
creation of an 
Expert Group 
on 
Securitisation 
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Table A3. cont’d 
Mortgage funding 
(covered bonds – debt 
instruments secured by a 
cover pool of eligible 
assets, e.g. mortgage 
loans): 
• non-existent legal 
framework in some 
member states; and 
• collateral instrument 
limitations (regarding the 
eligibility of assets for 
covering covered bonds). 
X X     
Carrying out an 
investigation into 
covered bond 
rules 
 
Mortgage funding 
(residential mortgage-
backed securities): 
• diversity and 
fragmentation of national 
securitisation 
frameworks; and 
• limits for UCITS 
(undertakings for 
collective investment in 
transferable securities) 
with regard to 
investments in the 
residential mortgage-
backed securities of 
single, residential 
mortgage-backed 
securities issuers (Art. 22, 
UCITS Directive). b) 
X        
Mortgage funding 
(transferability of 
mortgage loan 
portfolios): 
• existence of the 
requirement for consent 
or notification of the 
borrower for assignment 
of the claim; and 
• requirement of 
registration for changes 
to the beneficiary of the 
collateral. 
X X       
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Table A3. cont’d 
Mortgage funding 
(reporting): 
• different levels of 
reporting across the EU; 
• lack of consistency in 
definitions across the 
EU. 
X X       
Mortgage funding 
(data protection): 
• uncertainty in the 
interpretation of the 
definition of ‘personal 
data’ in the Data 
Protection Directive; c)  
• the requirement of the 
borrower’s consent as 
the legal basis for the 
processing of personal 
data. 
X        
Mortgage funding 
(Basel II): d)  
• differences in 
interpretation and 
application of the 
Capital Requirements 
Directive e) 
(14.6.2006) across 
jurisdictions; and 
• uncertainty regarding 
the sunset clause for the 
eligibility of residential 
mortgage-backed 
securities tranches as 
cover assets for covered 
bonds. 
X        
Infrastructure           
Credit registers: 
• restricted access to 
credit registers; 
• high cost of obtaining 
credit data; and  
• incomplete reporting. 
X     X 
Preparation of a 
study on credit 
registers 
Creation of the 
Expert Group on 
Credit Histories 
Carrying out an 
investigation into 
credit data rules 
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Table A3. cont’d 
Land registration: 
• problems with the 
accessibility of land 
registers; 
• high cost and long 
duration of land 
registration procedures; 
• lack of completeness of 
the land register (certain 
charges imposed on real 
estate are not accurately 
reflected – the so-called 
‘hidden charges’). 
X     X 
Recommendations 
on land 
registration, 
foreclosure and 
property valuation 
Presentation of 
scoreboards on 
land registration 
Long forced-sale 
procedures 
X     
Recommendations 
on land 
registration, 
foreclosure and 
property valuation 
Property valuation: 
• lack of reliable 
valuation standards 
(lack of common 
valuation principles, 
valuation methodologies 
and standards for the 
professional 
qualification of property 
valuers); and 
• difficulties in using the 
valuation report for a 
foreign property in 
relations with public 
authorities. 
X     
Recommendations 
on land 
registration, 
foreclosure and 
property valuation 
 
Supply           
Product tying  X     X  Preparation  of  a 
study/ 
investigation 
Demand           
Financial education – 
insufficient levels of 
financial literacy 
   X   
Communication on 
financial education 
(issued) 
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Table A3. cont’d 
Supply and demand           
Product suitability: 
• insufficient or 
incorrect assessment of 
creditworthiness; and 
• the sub-optimal 
quality of advice. 
   X   
Examination on 
responsible 
lending 
Preparation of 
policy options 
assessment 
Consultation of 
stakeholders on 
advice standards 
Other           
Lack of standardised, 
comparable house 
price indices across the 
EU 
X      
 
a) European Economic Community, Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 
opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/ 
en/lvb/l33109.htm). 
b) Council of the European Union, Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:%2001985L0611-20050413:EN:NOT), with further 
amending Directives (see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/legal_texts/ 
index_en.htm).  
c)  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 95/46/EC 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML). 
d) See BIS (2004). The purpose of Basel II is to make regulatory capital requirements for banks more 
risk-sensitive, encourage banks to improve their risk management processes and facilitate market 
discipline on banks.  
e) The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) comprises Directive 2006/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0001:0001:EN:PDF) and Directive 
2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0201:0201:EN:PDF). 
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APPENDIX 4. THE 28TH REGIME 
he so-called ‘28th regime’, first proposed in 2003 by Eurofi and later 
considered by the European Financial Services Round Table is a set 
of optional measures for consumer protection in relation to financial 
products marketed across the EU. Therefore, an institution can choose to 
apply the 28th regime or continue to operate under the national laws. To 
prevent transposition divergences among different member states, the 
proposed scheme is to be established by means of an EU regulation.  
In essence, the regime allows institutions to have access to the EU 
market without having to comply with the different consumer protection 
rules in each member state the product is offered. Service providers may 
also continue to operate under the host country rules. The new regime 
seeks to cut the compliance costs without giving rise to unnecessary 
implementation costs.  
The European Commission’s Green Paper on Retail Financial Services 
has suggested that the optional regime could be examined as a potential 
solution for the cross-border integration of financial services, particularly 
for savings and private pension schemes.99 The European Parliament has 
supported the idea of assessing whether the proposed optional regime 
would help achieve that objective.100  
Allowing foreign products to be provided in the domestic market is a 
touchy matter, whether it is accomplished by an optional scheme or by 
changing laws altogether. The effort could be comparable in its complexity 
to achieving full harmonisation across the EU. An over-prescriptive set of 
rules would not be preferable for some; in turn, some governments may be 
concerned that a less prescriptive regime would provide regulatory 
                                                      
99 See the Green Paper, COM(2007) 226 final (European Commission, 2007f). 
100 The Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the Green Paper on retail 
financial services on 5 June 2008. In its adopted text (T6-0261/2008), the Parliament 
calls on the Commission to put forward a timeframe to investigate the feasibility of 
the optional regime and highlights that the new regime should not in any way 
become an obstacle to the development of new services and products.  
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arbitrage opportunities.101 More generally, the optional scheme – much like 
a harmonised mandatory regime – may override national interests and may 
be politically undesirable for some member states.102 
A likely candidate for disagreements is the fiscal treatment of pan-EU 
pensions under the 28th regime. The tax treatment of private pensions 
varies significantly across member states. For example, while France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK tax only the benefits (operating under 
the so-called ‘EET’ system),103 smaller countries, such as Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Portugal, tax contributions 
(Yoo and De Serres, 2004). Unless a common ground is reached, the cross-
border provision of pension services could lead to the double-taxation of 
benefits during the transfer of vested rights and additional administrative 
costs for corporations providing pension services under different tax 
systems.  
An optional scheme may also provide member states insufficient 
incentives to fully implement it. Indeed, countries with a predominant 
concern to preserve their national interests would have little to lose if 
various elements of the optional regime were left out. This would not be 
the case under full harmonisation, which would replace national laws and 
in doing so create incentives to ensure full engagement.  
In summary, the development of an alternative 28th regime may be 
lengthy and the take-up of the final product may be less than sufficient. 
 
                                                      
101 A similar concern was raised by the Commission’s Expert Forum of Financial 
Services Users (FIN-USE) in its response to the Commission’s Green Paper (FIN-
USE, 2007). According to the document detailing its response, care must be taken 
so that the regime does not become a “Trojan Horse designed to reduce the levels of 
consumer protection” across the EU (p. 34, emphasis given in the original). The 
FIN-USE response is available on the European Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/policy/gp_ 
other_eu_finuse_en.pdf). 
102 In their responses to the Commission’s Green Paper (COM(2007) 226 final), most 
member states have opposed the establishment of a 28th regime.  
103 The fiscal treatment of retirement savings schemes around the world is 
distinguished by how countries tax contributions, investment returns and 
retirement benefits, respectively. EET (exempt-exempt tax) implies that only the 
third item, benefits, is taxed while contributions and investment returns are 
exempt. TEE stands for a system that taxes contributions but holds interest 
earnings and final benefits exempt from taxation INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 77 
 
If member states are unwilling to harmonise consumer protection rules for 
fear of diluting national laws, they would be equally reluctant to give the 
optional scheme a fair chance. A better approach for enhancing the 
integration of financial services across Europe may be pushing for full 
harmonisation in key areas and mutual recognition in the remaining areas.  
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APPENDIX 5.  
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES AND ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE CEPS-ECRI TASK FORCE ON THE INTERNAL 
MARKET FOR RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AEGON Scottish Equitable 
AG Insurance 
APCO Worldwide 
Banco Santander 
BBVA 
BNP Paribas Fortis Bank 
BPCE – Banque Populaire Caisses d’Epargne 
British Bankers’ Association 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
CEA – European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation 
Citi 
Citigate Dewe Rogerson Public Policy 
Clifford Chance LLP 
Cologne University of Applied Sciences 
Commerzbank AG 
Credit Suisse Asia Pacific 
Danish Bankers’ Association (Finansradet) 
Deutsche Börse AG 
Deutsche Post AG 
Energy Charter Secretariat 
Ernst & Young Sweden LLP 
Euro Alliance 
EUROFI 
Eurofinas/Leaseurope 
European Banking Federation (EBF-FBE) 
European Commission 
European Federation of Building Societies INTEGRATING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE | 79 
 
European Financial Services Round Table (EFR) 
European Funds & Asset Management Association (Efama) 
European Savings Banks Group-World Savings Banks Institute 
Fédération Bancaire Française 
Federation of Austrian Industry 
Finance & Leasing Association 
Financial Services Authority 
FIN-USE 
Fleishman-Hillard 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires 
HBOS plc 
Heilbronn Business School & LECG 
Houston Consulting Europe 
ING Group 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
KULeuven – Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Lloyds TSB 
Mastercard 
McKinsey & Company 
National Bank of Austria 
Novo Nordisk 
Nykredit Realkredit A/S 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Postbank ING Group 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
SEB 
The Global Consulting Group 
University of Ljubljana 
University of Maastricht 
Uria Menendez 
Visa Europe 
Volkswagen AG 
Western Union 
White & Case 
 